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People represent the self (self-structure) using cognitive strategies that either confront 
(integration) or avoid (compartmentalization) negative self-information (Showers, 
1992).  Previous research has found that compartmentalization predicts dishonesty on 
academic performance tasks under neutral conditions in the laboratory (Showers, 
Thomas, & Grundy, 2015; Thomas, 2015).  The current experiments extend this work 
by using an online paradigm to assess cheating via a coin flip procedure (Bryan, Adams, 
& Monin, 2013).  Here, two experiments seek to replicate the association between 
compartmentalization and dishonesty under various priming conditions.  In Experiment 
1, individuals with compartmentalized selves were more dishonest than were 
individuals with integrative selves, especially under conditions of a “cheater” prime.  In 
Experiment 2, results showed that individuals with integrative selves remained 
relatively honest compared to individuals with compartmentalized selves even under 
conditions of greater temptation (money prime).  These findings are consistent with the 
model that individuals with compartmentalized selves defensively avoid negative 
interpretations of their own behavior.  Instead, they may rationalize their dishonesty as 
normative or even self-enhancing.  Conversely, individuals with integrative selves 
vigilantly process dishonest behavior as having negative implications for the self, 
thereby motivating themselves to behave more honestly.  This model of defensive self-





Organization of Self-Knowledge Predicts Unethical Behavior 
Carl Rogers’s (1961) conception of a fully functioning person, someone open 
about personal needs and driven to self-actualize, implies inherent goodness in 
humankind.  Although Rogers paints a rosy picture, the fact is that unethical behavior 
remains prevalent in everyday life (cf. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 
1998).  A report cited by Dinh and Lord (2013) from the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) estimates organizations lose over $1 trillion globally per year due to 
conduct deemed unethical.  This figure has since grown and ACFE’s 2014 report 
estimated global organizational loss of over $3.7 trillion due to fraud (ACFE, 2014).  
Within the U.S. alone, the National Retail Federation (NRF, 2015) concluded that U.S 
retailers lost $31.9 billion in 2014 due to shoplifting and employee theft.  These figures 
demonstrate the importance for researchers to understand the mechanisms underlying 
unethical behavior so attempts can be made to reduce such behavior.  Unfortunately, a 
recent review of ethical judgment and behavior research by Dinh and Lord (2013) 
concludes that “attention to the dynamics of moral processing has been limited, and a 
more holistic understanding of these processes is needed to provide a comprehensive 
framework for theory and interventions” (p. 380). 
Although a comprehensive framework remains elusive, a substantial body of 
research has studied unethical behavior, dishonesty, and moral functioning from various 
perspectives: psychology (Hartshorne & May, 1928; Piaget, 1932/1965; Aronson & 
Mettee, 1968; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a; Haidt, 2001; see also Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2012); business (Ford & Richardson, 2005; Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-
Gephart, 2014); and academic institutions (McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 2001).  
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This research has attempted to illuminate the psychological processes associated with 
ethical behavior to understand why, if people are inherently good (as Rogers claimed), 
unethical behavior remains so pervasive.  
The current experiments propose a framework that predicts ethical behavior 
using Showers’s (1992) model of self-structure.  She has demonstrated that an 
individual difference exists among people for how they cognitively organize negative, 
potentially threatening self-knowledge.  People are either willing to acknowledge and 
confront negative self-knowledge (integration); or defensively to avoid and deny 
negative self-knowledge (compartmentalization).  Thus, people with integrative selves 
may be especially likely to confront unethical behavior and view it as detrimental for 
the self, promoting ethical choices.  Conversely, people with compartmentalized selves 
may avoid or deny any negative implications that unethical behavior has for the self, 
encouraging unethical choices.  Interestingly, literature on the role of the self in ethical 
behavior has emerged only since researchers have shifted away from a perspective that 
viewed morality as a rational trait, developed in stages throughout the lifespan.  Not 
until after the cognitive revolution of the 1960’s and into the 1980’s did the self become 
central to an understanding of ethical behavior and moral functioning (cf. Blasi, 1983).   
Early Perspectives on Ethical Behavior, Dishonesty, and Morality 
Historically, research on moral functioning (i.e., ethical behavior) can be 
represented on a continuum from a purely trait-based approach to a purely situation-
based approach.  From a relatively trait-based end of the spectrum, early researchers 
took a stage approach to moral judgment and development (Piaget, 1932/1965; 
Kohlberg et al., 1984a).  These approaches focused on the development of consistency 
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within moral judgment and reasoning.  The basis for these theories lies in controlled 
reasoning and cognitive deliberation.  Over time, a rational agent with an ideal form of 
morality may develop.  Morality is seen as a stable, conscious activity not motivated by 
situational forces (e.g., transient emotional states).  Two researchers, Jean Piaget and 
Lawrence Kohlberg, were heavily influential with this type of approach to morality. 
Piaget (1932/1965) defined the development of moral judgment with two stages: 
moral heteronomy and moral autonomy.  The heteronomous stage (approximately ages 
4 to 7) reflected a child’s conception of morality as literal and absolute (i.e., right or 
wrong), derived from external authority (e.g., caregivers, teachers).  Children in this 
egocentric stage processed whether a violation of rules or harmful outcome occurred 
with no ability to take intention or another’s perspective into account.  Older children 
(approximately ages 8 to 10) matured into the autonomous stage, marked by perspective 
taking and an understanding of intention.  This stage was marked by less reliance on 
external authority and absolute rules.  Instead, children began to evaluate intention and 
understand perspective-taking through interactions with their peers.  In addition, moral 
judgment was used as a means to foster group agreement and cooperation. 
Kohlberg (1984a) refined Piaget’s stage approach into adulthood.  Unlike 
Piaget, Kohlberg’s primary concern went beyond a simple right or wrong judgment for 
a given moral dilemma.  Kohlberg was also interested in people’s rationale 
sophistication for such judgment.  Kohlberg’s first level of moral development 
(preconventional) found that children sought to avoid punishment, obeyed authority 
without question, and motive by egocentric needs (similar to Piaget’s heteronomous 
stage).  The second level (conventional) marked a shift from an egocentric morality to a 
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morality based on societal rules, objective right and wrong for behavior, the 
development of a conscience, and the desire to be perceived by others as a good person.  
The third and final level (postconventional) emphasized an idealized sense of morality 
through the development of a person’s own moral principles transcending societal 
definitions or prescribed laws of right and wrong.  In this level, there exists a personal 
commitment to uphold a morality that promotes a right to life above all else and a 
common good for all people.  Kohlberg’s notion of an idealized and consistent morality 
undoubtedly continues to influence theories of ethical behavior and moral development 
today (cf. Lapsley & Carlo, 2014).  However, researchers disagree about the consistency 
of ethical behavior or the notion that morality develops in stages.  
Around the time Piaget first introduced his approach to moral development, 
researchers with a relatively situationist approach found little support for stable patterns 
with regard to unethical behavior.  Hartshorne and May (1928) conducted their Studies 
in Deceit to investigate whether temptation and unethical behavior was consistent (i.e., 
a trait) over 9 different situations, presumably activating different aspects of the self-
concept within each setting.  These situations ranged from paper-and-pencil intelligence 
tests that were self-scored to athletic measures of lung capacity and chin ups scored by 
research assistants.  The authors found that deceitful behavior was consistent within 
persons only to the extent that the testing contexts were similar.  Overall, Hartshorne 
and May (1928) concluded that each situation elicits a varying degree of deceit 
depending on the set of motives, values, and learned responses guiding behavior.   
Taken together, these early models highlight the two ends of the moral 
functioning spectrum.  Piaget (1932/1965) and Kohlberg’s (1984a) work suggests moral 
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functioning develops across one’s lifespan and remains consistent across situations.  
Meanwhile, Hartshorne and May (1928) found little overlap in moral functioning 
between situations, suggesting a lack of stable, consistent ethical behavior.  Thus, the 
competing models from decades ago suggest that morality may not completely develop 
as a universally stable trait (i.e., individual difference) nor is it completely driven by the 
influence of one’s current situation.  Instead, people seem to rely on a combination of 
person and situation factors to maintain their own idiosyncratic definition of what it 
means to be moral, honest, and ethical. 
Cognitive Strategies Approach to Ethical Behavior, Dishonesty, and Morality 
The so-called “cognitive revolution” in psychology shifted the field into a more 
nuanced understanding of how people process social (and moral) information into 
behavior.  Walter Mischel’s (1968, 1973) groundbreaking cognitive social learning 
theory of personality advanced how researchers assessed and operationalized 
personality as a construct.  Mischel (1973) suggested that personality was not strictly a 
stage-developed, global characteristic of a person.  Instead, person variables should be 
seen as a dynamic set of socially learned schemas and cognitive strategies that people 
deploy in specific situations to guide behavior.  Mischel believed the assessment of a 
person’s idiosyncratic definition of a situation or stimulus was central to an 
understanding of their social behavior.  For instance, two different people may define 
the personality characteristic of “being nice” toward their server after a meal with 
unique, personalized schemas.  These schemas allow a person to initiate a cognitive 
strategy for behavior.  One person might determine that “being nice” means they should 
behave pleasantly throughout the meal, depart with a smile and say thank you to the 
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server, but leave no tip.  The second person might believe that “being nice” means they 
should eat quickly with little interaction or warmth toward the server, but leave a huge 
tip.  Depending on the type of restaurant and payment structure for the server (i.e., the 
situation), each person might be considered nice or mean by their server.  Thus, the unit 
of focus shifts from consistent, global characteristics a person has to the cognitive 
strategies that guide what a person does in a given situation (Mischel, 1973; Cantor, 
1990).   
The key to understanding what a person does is a mixture of previous 
experience and consideration of the situation.  After the experience or observation of a 
situation and subsequent behavioral response (the doing of a person), people cognitively 
encode and categorize the event, or update a previously learned schema, script, or 
prototype.  This learned information is then applied strategically to determine future 
behavior in subjectively perceived similar situations (Mischel, 1973).  With schemas, 
people organize previous knowledge using the schema to filter social information (e.g., 
directing attention) and develop cognitive strategies for action (Showers & Cantor, 
1985; Cantor, 1990).  These strategies are motivated by a person’s specific goals, mood, 
and capabilities.  In this way, people may develop a consistent, self-imposed preference 
or aversion to contextual information that has previously produced desirable or 
undesirable behavioral outcomes (Mischel, 1973).   
Mischel applied his theory to ethical behavior specifically, by reanalyzing the 
Hartshorne and May (1928) data.  Mischel concluded in part that, “rather than acquiring 
a homogenous conscience that determines uniformly all aspects of their self-control, 
people seem to develop subtler discriminations that depend on many considerations” (p. 
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26).  The “many considerations” include a person’s activated schema and cognitive 
strategies that guide behavior to be consistent with perceived goals and standards.  
Individual differences (or traits) are useful insofar as people activate a schema for a 
given situation to filter social information with learned, consistent cognitive strategies 
that instigate behavior.  Thus, different people may apply different schemas and 
strategies that uniquely determine what it means for that person to behave ethically or 
unethically.   
Subsequent researchers applied Mischel’s initial thoughts on the malleability of 
ethical behavior using a social cognitive approach (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; 2005).  
Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) most directly applied Mischel’s theory, acknowledging 
that a difficulty exists with the claim of consistency between disparate situations and 
trait morality.  Instead, they emphasized how people utilize both conscious and 
unconscious cognitive strategies when determining whether to behave ethically.  For 
Lapsley and Narvaez (2004), stability of ethical behavior exists to the extent that people 
maintain consistent “goal systems” that filter social information (i.e., the activated 
schema) into moral terms.  Depending on the degree to which a person processes social 
information as morally relevant, a cognitive strategy for how to behave may instigate 
either an ethical or unethical response.  Over time, as people continually and 
consistently activate their morally related schemas, the schemas become chronically 
activated (i.e., efficient and automatic).  In Lapsley and Narvaez’s view, individual 
differences in ethical behavior exist as people habitually activate morally related 
schemas when processing social information (moral chronicity).  The current 
experiments take a cognitive strategies approach to how people organize and evaluate 
8 
 
self-concept related schemas.  We propose that the strategy a person uses to manage 
negative self-knowledge predicts unethical behavior. 
Organizing Self-Knowledge 
The self can be thought of as the conduit by which the person and the social 
environment interact.  People view the self through a multidimensional lens, organizing 
self-knowledge into multiple, contextualized cognitive representations of the self (self-
aspects; Markus & Wurf, 1987).  People categorize self-aspects into specific roles, 
experiences, domains, relationships, and attributes (Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992).  
Given a person’s current social and emotional context, a specific self-aspect becomes 
activated, helping to direct cognition, affect, motivation, self-regulation, and behavior.  
Showers’s (1992) model of evaluative self-structure emphasizes how people cognitively 
represent positive and negative self-attributes within self-aspects.     
According to Showers’s model, people organize negative self-attributes on a 
continuum from perfectly integrative to perfectly compartmentalized.  A perfectly 
integrative self-structure would be someone that evenly distributes negative self-
attributes across all self-aspects (for an example see Table 1, Panel B).  Both positive 
and negative self-attributes are present within each self-aspect.  Rather than denying the 
possession of negative self-attributes within most self-aspect, people who integrate 
acknowledge their negative features.  On the other hand, a perfectly compartmentalized 
self-structure is someone who completely separates negative self-attributes from 
positive self-attributes within self-aspects (Table 1, Panel A).  People who 
compartmentalize activate only positive or negative self-attributes, depending on the 
contextually activated self-aspect.  In this way, they avoid or deny the possession 
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negative self-beliefs as long as positive compartments remain active.  When prompted, 
people can make distinctions between self-aspects as being more or less important to 
the self, and as more or less positive and negative in valence (Pelham & Swann, 1989). 
People who compartmentalize evaluate their positive self-aspects as more 
important (positively compartmentalized) report the highest self-esteem and most 
positive mood.  Moreover, in certain situations a person with a positively 
compartmentalized self-structure may react defensively to avoid activating negative 
self-aspects to maintain a more positive, if not artificially inflated, overall self-view.  
On the other hand, people who integrate maintain a relatively moderate level of self-
esteem and mood regardless of the importance or activation of positively or negatively 
evaluated self-aspects.  By including both positive and negative self-attributes within 
any given self-aspect, integrative individuals stabilize a more modest self-view 
(Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007).   
Compartmentalization’s self-worth roller coaster.  People with a 
compartmentalized self-structure report the highest self-esteem and mood when the 
going is good; they are also prone to instability when the going gets tough.  Positive and 
negative situations and events occur on a daily basis, activating relevant self-knowledge 
and attributes (Markus & Kunda, 1986).  People who compartmentalize may 
strategically process negative self-knowledge in a defensive manner to minimize the 
impact of and easily avoid negative self-knowledge (Showers, Thomas, & Ditzfeld, 
2013).  When this strategy is effective, people use only positive attributes to evaluate 
the self.  The result is higher self-esteem and a more positive mood.  However, when 
negative self-knowledge is unavoidable (e.g., after social rejection or academic failure), 
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people who compartmentalize experience a greater drop in state self-esteem and a more 
negative mood than do people who integrate (Ziegler-Hill & Showers, 2007).  The 
authors describe the peaks and valleys of self-worth as compartmentalization’s “hidden 
vulnerability” (p. 1185).  The sudden flood in activation of negative (or positive) self-
attributes while simultaneously lacking access to positive (or negative) self-attributes 
promotes more extreme reactivity (i.e., fluctuations or instability of self-esteem and 
mood) to any given situation or event.  In contrast, people who integrate tend not to 
experience inflated highs or depressed lows within any activated self-aspect.  Their 
strategy is to distribute negative self-knowledge more evenly across self-aspects that 
also contain positive self-knowledge.  This allows people who integrate to confront 
negative self-knowledge in a more stable fashion and elude compartmentalization’s 
reactive roller coaster. 
Compartmentalization can be considered a manifestation of a fragile, defensive 
self.  Crocker and Wolfe’s (2001) contingencies of self-worth theory supports the 
notion of self-fragility in response to feedback about an important self-domain.  For 
instance, they find that people whose self-worth is highly conditional on academic 
success report higher self-esteem on days they are accepted into graduate school and 
lower self-esteem on days they are rejected.  In addition, people with unstable high-self 
esteem react to negative feedback by offering excuses and blaming others for poor 
performance (Kernis, Cornell, Sunn, Berry, & Harlow, 1993) and with proneness 
toward hostility and aggression (Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989).  Indeed, 
research suggests that people who compartmentalize are emotionally more reactive to 
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situational feedback compared to integratives.  People who integrate tend to be 
relatively more stable and secure (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014).   
Several studies have found support for the notion of compartmentalization’s 
hidden vulnerability in domains beyond the self.  Showers and Kling (1996) found that 
after being induced to a sad mood, people who compartmentalize took longer to recover 
than did people who integrate.  The absence of positive self-attributes during a period of 
sadness made people who compartmentalize especially vulnerable to prolonged states of 
low self-worth.  Similarly, compartmentalization has been associated with defensive 
processing of romantic partner information (Showers & Kevlyn, 1999).  The authors 
found that early in a relationship, a positively compartmentalized partner structure was 
associated with a more positive attitude toward that partner.  However, a follow-up 
assessment 1 year later found that compartmentalization was associated with the end of 
that relationship.  These findings suggest that early in a relationship, defensive 
processing of negative partner information facilitates a honeymoon period during which 
one’s partner can do no wrong.  However, this exceedingly positive view of one’s 
partner is fleeting.  As the relationship continues, this unrealistic view becomes 
vulnerable to flaws of the partner that cannot remain denied.  Relationships in which a 
partner’s negative attributes are acknowledged and confronted (integrative partner 
structure) are more likely to continue beyond the honeymoon period.   
This research suggests that how a person manages negative self-knowledge 
(self-structure) reliably predicts self-esteem, mood instability, and the defensive 
processing of information.  The current experiments extend the self-structure model into 
the domain of ethical behavior.  The following sections begin with a review of literature 
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on how the self can influence unethical behavior.  Then we discuss how a defensive 
self-structure may predict unethical behavior.  Finally, we consider additional individual 
difference factors that predict unethical behavior before outlining the current 
experiments. 
The Self’s Influence on Ethical Behavior 
Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) credit Augusto Blasi’s (1983) Self Model as the 
first to recognize the role of the self as a motivator of ethical behavior.  Blasi (1983) 
described a person’s moral identity as the extent to which concepts such as being fair, 
just, or good were central to the construction of the self.  The mechanism driving ethical 
behavior is a person’s need for self-consistency.  In this way, ethical behavior can be 
thought stable and predictable as a person’s moral identity becomes central to the self.  
However, Blasi (1983) relied heavily on Piaget’s work and provided only a starting 
point to emphasize the relationship between the self and ethical behavior.  Another line 
of earlier research by Aronson and Mettee (1968) also suggests that self-consistency can 
motivate unethical behavior.  For these authors, the self influences ethical behavior by 
activating a cognitive strategy aimed to reduce dissonance between one’s primed self-
regard and subsequent ethical behavior.  Specifically, they gave participants negative 
feedback on a personality test meant to prime low self-esteem.  After the negative self-
esteem prime, people were more likely to cheat on a card game.  Conversely, people 
primed with high self-esteem behaved with honesty.  The authors concluded that 
people’s unethical (or ethical) behavior reinforced their primed negative (or positive) 
self-esteem suggesting a motivation for consistency between the self and behavior.  To 
summarize, a person’s processing of the current situation and feelings about the self can 
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promote unethical (or ethical) behavior.  However, priming self-esteem or seeking self-
consistency is only part of a dynamic, complex self-concept that influences ethical 
behavior.     
Recently, the notion of a moral self has been described as operating at a 
“working” level.  In this view, the self can be described differently as situational 
changes occur to one’s environment (Monin & Jordan, 2009).  Although “my moral 
self” might not be a specific self-aspect, a situation that activates a self-aspect with a 
similar meaning can guide ethical behavior.  Indeed, research has established that 
activating the self (either a specific self-aspect or, more broadly, one’s identity) prior to 
assessing ethical behavior can affect behavioral outcomes. (For a review of the self’s 
role in prime-to-behavior effects, see Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007.)  There are 
two mechanisms central to the current experiments that demonstrate the influence of the 
self on ethical behavior.  The first, self-awareness, describes the active self perspective 
(Diener & Wallbom, 1976; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 
2013).  The second, self-enhancement, describes a broad, individual difference that 
influences a person’s identity (von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005; Paulhus & John, 
1998; as a form of narcissism, see Vazire & Funder, 2006).   
Self-awareness.  When people are made to be self-aware, their active self (i.e., 
self-schema) serves as a strategic filter of social information that can motivate behavior.  
When a person perceives an ethical dilemma, the active self’s motivations and desires 
direct their decision on how to behave.  Zimbardo (1970) theorized that decreased self-
awareness (i.e., deindividuation) facilitated antinormative behavior that would normally 
be restrained.  For instance, Diener and Wallbom (1976) found support for this theory 
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specifically with cheating behavior.  The authors increased self-awareness by having 
people sit in front of a mirror, viewing themselves during the task, and replaying their 
own voice with a tape recorder.  Their results showed that people in the self-aware 
condition cheated at a remarkably lower rate (7% of participants) than those in the no 
self-awareness condition (71%).   
More recently, Kallgren et al. (2000; Study 3) tested how personal norms against 
unethical behavior (i.e., littering) would be affected by self-awareness.  The authors 
triggered self-awareness by having participants view a video of themselves during the 
experiment.  They found that even for people who held a strong personal norm against 
littering; there was only a reduction in littering when they were made self-aware.  
Similarly, Vincent, Emich, & Goncarlo (2013) used the mirror manipulation while 
assessing cheating on arithmetic problems for money.  Their findings support the notion 
that low self-awareness can increase unethical behavior, which in this case involved 
reporting more correct answers and receiving unearned money.  Interestingly, Vincent 
and colleagues found that this effect was most pronounced for participants primed with 
positive affect.  The authors suggest that positive affect increases the flexibility for 
categorizing behavior (a cognitive strategy).  This flexibility promotes what the authors 
described as “a moral gray zone” (p. 598) when interpreting unethical behavior.  This 
gray zone may help people avoid or disengage their “moral self” when behaving 
unethically.   
In addition, less blatant means to increase self-awareness can also reduce 
unethical behavior.  A manipulation as subtle as a noun frame that triggers a focus on 
identity can influence ethical behavior (e.g., “How important is it to you TO BE A 
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VOTER [versus TO VOTE] in tomorrow’s election?”).  People who received the “to be 
a voter” question frame (i.e., identity prime) were more likely to vote in an election a 
day later (Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011).  The authors suggest that this 
framing implies an approach orientation to achieve a desirable identity (i.e., to be a 
voter).  People not only behave in ways to achieve sought-after identities, but also to 
avoid unfavorable identities.  In a subsequent study, Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) 
found that cheating to gain extra, unearned money was reduced when participants were 
primed with a “being a cheater” identity.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
when people become focused on identity (i.e. self-aware) they behave more honestly.  
The current experiments test whether conditions that prime identity affect whether a 
person’s self-structure facilitates or inhibits unethical behavior.  
Self-enhancement.  The second mechanism reflects an individual difference in 
how a person processes information related to the self.  People who self-enhance tend to 
process information related to the self in a biased fashion, promoting overly positive 
self-regard.  Specific to ethical behavior, von Hippel et al. (2005) found that people who 
construe positive outcomes associated with the self as more important than negative 
outcomes (i.e., self enhancers) failed to prevent an answer from being displayed on a 
computer-adapted mental math task.  This unethical behavior resulted in unmerited 
correct answers.  Furthermore, self-enhancement has been associated with exaggerated 
social status and intellect (egotistic bias; Paulhus & John, 1998).  An egotistic bias can 
be considered a form of narcissism in which people expect praise without achievement 
and exaggerate their abilities or accomplishments.  In this way, self-enhancers (and, by 
extension, narcissists) may be prone to distort their performance on tasks in a way that 
16 
 
results in greater achievement even if it is undeserved and obtained through unethical 
means.  Also, narcissists show impulsivity, seeking short-term reward at the expense of 
more lasting positive outcomes.  The short-term gains through unethical means often 
foil a narcissist’s desire for higher status and recognition (Vazire & Funder, 2006).   
Research has linked individual differences related to the self or identity with 
ethical behavior (e.g., Blasi, 1983; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley 
& Narvaez, 2004; von Hippel et al., 2005).  However, this research has largely 
overlooked a central feature of the self, namely, how a person cognitively represents the 
self-concept.  For instance, Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) highlight the importance of the 
moral self and describe the need to understand the schemas used to alter behavior.  They 
relate the self to ethical behavior through the self’s influence on social information-
processing, focusing on ease of access to morally related self-schemas (viz., moral 
chronicity).  However, this previous research has not examined the content and 
organization of a person’s self-concept (self-structure).  The current experiments take 
the notion of a moral self in a novel direction and show that a person’s self-structure, 
more specifically how defensive processing of negative self-knowledge, predicts 
unethical behavior.  
 Defensive Self-Structure and Ethical Behavior   
A person with an insecure self (i.e., defensive and unstable) may be motivated to 
maintain positive self-worth even if it means behaving unethically.  For instance, 
Gillath and colleagues found that priming insecure attachment was associated with 
dishonesty (i.e., unethical behavior).  The authors concluded that a stable, secure self 
“allows a person to forego various kinds of defenses and be more open and honest with 
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others and more true to oneself” (p. 853; Gillath, Sesko, Shaver, & Chun, 2010).  
Specific to Showers’s (1992) self-structure model, Bozeman (2012) found that for 
people with high self-esteem, compartmentalization increased after an insecure 
attachment prime.  People with compartmentalized selves tend to process defensively 
information that threatens the self which may leave them vulnerable to feelings of 
insecurity.  Conversely, people with integrative selves possess a more secure self, 
willing to confront and admit possession of negative self-attributes.  Without the need 
for defensive processing, people who integrate may also be open to confronting the 
negative implications for the self of engaging in unethical behavior.   
A person with a defensively compartmentalized self may cognitively process 
unethical behavior in a biased fashion to prevent negative self-beliefs from creeping 
into their active self.  Recall that von Hippel et al. (2005) find that self enhancers 
positively bias their processing of information about the self.  By doing this, self-
enhancers can rationalize cheating as only an unavoidable mistake, not an unethical 
behavior, and focus on the potentially desirable outcome instead (e.g., the reward of 
additional money).   People who compartmentalize may use a similarly biased 
processing strategy to minimize the accessibility of negative self-beliefs, especially with 
regard to behaving unethically.  Indeed, Shu and Gino (2012) find evidence supporting 
a biased processing mechanism for unethical behavior.  Their results show that when a 
situation seemingly permits cheating (i.e., no ethics code statement before taking a test), 
people are motivated to forget about morality (moral disengagement) and take 
advantage of the opportunity to cheat.  In this situation, people are motivated to limit 
access to ethics-related concepts that may otherwise prevent cheating (Shu, Gino, & 
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Bazerman, 2011).  Ostensibly, people who compartmentalize defensively process the 
implications of cheating (i.e., avoid incorporating negative attributes into the active self) 
when the situation permits.   
How a person manages negative knowledge about the self may promote 
unethical behavior for the sake of self-consistency or to protect unstable but high self-
worth.  This organizational strategy may also provide insight into how people process 
unethical or dishonest behavior (i.e., cheating).  The underlying theme of the present 
studies is that, if people tend to avoid acknowledging negative self-attributes 
(compartmentalization), they may also avoid processing unethical behavior in a 
negative light.  They avoid processing the negative implications of their behavior (e.g., 
cheating on a math test or taking unearned money).  Instead, they construe their 
unethical behavior in positive terms (e.g., showing superior math ability or receiving 
more money).  In this way, they can maintain a consistently positive view of the self 
and protect against fluctuations in self-worth.  Conversely, people who tend to confront 
their negative self-attributes (integration) may also be willing to process the harmful 
outcomes of unethical behavior.  Their acknowledgement that cheating can reflect 
negatively on the self promotes more honest, ethical behavior. 
Other Individual Differences That Influence Ethical Behavior 
Beyond self-concept related constructs, other individual differences can be 
powerful predictors of ethical or unethical behavior.   
Guilt and shame proneness.  A person’s tendency to experience the emotions 
of guilt or shame  predicts unethical behavior (Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2010; 
Cohen, Wolf, Painter, & Insko, 2011).  Guilt- and shame-prone people anticipate the 
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experience of negative emotions for personal transgression.  This sensitivity triggers 
negative self-consciousness (e.g., acute self-awareness) which promotes ethical and 
prosocial behavior (Cohen, 2011).  There are generally two major distinctions between 
guilt and shame, the self-behavior and public-private dichotomies.  Shame-prone people 
evaluate unethical behavior in relatively global, self-relevant terms.  On the other hand, 
guilt-prone people narrow their evaluation to the specific behavior and situation.  In 
addition, feelings of shame are elicited when a person’s unethical behavior occurs in 
public, whereas feelings of guilt stem from private unethical behavior (Cohen et al., 
2011). Similarly, feelings of shame-proneness tend to reduce public unethical behavior 
whereas guilt-proneness reduces private unethical behavior (Wolf et al., 2010).   
Creativity.  Although generally discussed in positive terms, creativity has also 
been associated with unethical behavior.  Highly creative people or people primed with 
a creative mindset more frequently behaved unethically (Gino & Ariely, 2012).  
Additionally, after behaving unethically, people became more creative (Wiltermuth & 
Gino, 204).  Being creative facilitates the discovery of original, innovative solutions for 
problem solving across disparate domains.  However creative people are also better at 
justifying dishonest behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012) and feel unconstrained by rules 
(Wiltermuth & Gino, 2014).  Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) apply the anecdote “rules are 
meant to be broken” (p. 979) as one underlying feature of both creativity and unethical 
behavior.  Interestingly, Gino & Ariely (2012, Experiments 3 & 4) found evidence that 
a positive association exists between creativity and moral flexibility.  Creative people 




Moral identity.  The extent to which moral character is central to a person’s 
identity (moral identity; Aquino & Reed, 2002) also predicts ethical behavior.  People 
acquire a strong or weak moral identity through life experience that varies across 
persons.  A strong moral identity suggests a person tends to value and has internalized 
morality-related concepts such as responsiveness to others or honesty (Aquino & Reed, 
2002; Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009).  Aquino and Reed (2002) discuss 
moral identity as one facet of a person’s set of self-schemas.  Thus, a strong moral 
identity becomes chronically accessible; it becomes a central self-schema used to 
process social information and guide behavior across situations.  Aquino and Reed 
(2002) found a relationship between moral identity and prosocial behavior (e.g., 
donating cans of food).  Also, when a person lacks access to their moral identity they 
tend to decrease their prosocial behavior and instead behave selfishly (Aquino et al., 
2009).       
The Current Experiments 
The current experiments examine the relationship between a person’s 
organization of self-knowledge (self-structure; Showers, 1992) and ethical behavior.  
Previous research has found a positive association between compartmentalization and 
cheating under neutral conditions (Showers et al., 2015; Thomas, 2015).  When people 
with compartmentalized selves have the opportunity to cheat, they may avoid negative 
implications for the self.  Instead, they may interpret their behavior in positive, self-
enhancing terms which facilitates cheating (e.g., “I earned more money” or “I 
outperformed others”).  On the other hand, people with integrative selves may be better 
equipped to acknowledge the negative implications of cheating.  As a result, they 
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willingly process unethical behavior’s negative impact for the self and remain more 
honest when given an opportunity to cheat.  The current experiments include measures 
of self-enhancement to explore this idea.  Additionally, in Experiment 2 we expose 
people to varying degrees of temptation unrelated to ego-depletion.  This tests whether 
people who integrate or people who compartmentalize are more sensitive to situational 
temptations to cheat.  The introduction for Experiment 2 thoroughly reviews research 
that demonstrates how the situation can influence ethical behavior.   
EXPERIMENT 1 
Overview and Predictions 
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to examine the relationship between self-
structure (compartmentalization or integration) and unethical behavior (i.e., cheating) 
under conditions of a neutral, “cheater,” or “cheating” prime.  In Experiment 1, the 
compartmentalization effect extends into an online cheating paradigm unrelated to math 
ability.  We use Bryan et al.’s (2013) online coin flip procedure to assess cheating 
behavior.  An online procedure potentially expands the diversity of participants and 
provides a more naturalistic, private environment compared to a traditional laboratory 
experiment.  Specifically, Bryan and colleagues find that people primed with a 
“cheater” identity remain honest compared to conditions with no identity prime (i.e., 
“cheating” or neutral).  It seems plausible that depending on a person’s self-structure 
they might respond to this prime differently.  The basic prediction is that people who 
integrate will be more sensitive to these primes, but especially the “cheater” identity 
prime.  Therefore, we predict that people who integrate will remain honest after 
receiving the “cheater” prime. 
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Moderator variable analysis explores whether constructs related to defensive 
responding affect the association between self-structure and cheating.  Specifically, self-
deceptive enhancement and narcissism are included to assess a tendency to respond 
defensively.  Generally, people who self-enhance (cf. von Hippel et al., 2005) or are 
narcissistic (Vazire & Funder, 2006) tend also to behave unethically.  Therefore, we 
predict a positive relationship between cheating and these two constructs.  Importantly, 
self-enhancement or narcissism may instigate a defensive response to threatening self-
knowledge and thus moderate the predicted relationship between self-structure and 
cheating.     
Method 
Participants 
 The sample was 150 undergraduate students (94 females) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course.  Participants volunteered for the experiment through 
the psychology department’s online research management system (sona-systems.com, 
or SONA) in partial fulfillment of a course research participation requirement.  In 
addition, participants received a monetary incentive for performance in the online 
portion of the study.  
Design 
 Experiment 1 is conceptually a 2 (self-structure: integrative or 
compartmentalized) x 3 (instruction conditions: cheater, cheating, or no instruction) 
design.  The self-structure measure is a continuous individual difference variable, 
whereas the instruction condition is manipulated between participants.  When including 
self-structure as predictor variables, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis tests the 
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main effects and two-way interactions.  The instruction condition variable is analyzed 
using an ANOVA and is also included in the regression analyses. 
Measures 
 Self-structure card sorting task.  The card-sorting task assessed the cognitive 
structure of a person’s self-concept (Showers, 1992).  Participants were given a deck of 
40 cards each containing an adjective that could be used to describe the self (20 
positively valenced, e.g., successful, independent, organized, happy; 20 negatively 
valenced, e.g., immature, insecure, disorganized, uncomfortable).  Participants were 
told, “Your task is to think of the different aspects of yourself or your life and then form 
groups of traits that go together, where each group of traits describes an aspect of 
yourself or your life.”  Participants created their own labels for each self-aspect and 
used the cards to describe each.  Participants were instructed to form as many different 
self-aspects as they desired, using as few or as many adjectives as needed.  Participants 
were allowed to use the same adjectives in multiple self-aspects or not at all, using only 
the attributes they felt could describe each self-aspect. Several variables relevant to the 
current experiment result from the card sort: evaluative organization, differential 
importance, and the proportion of negative attributes. 
 Evaluative organization (phi).  The measure of evaluative self organization is 
the phi coefficient based on a chi square statistic.  The phi coefficient indexes the 
deviation from chance of the number of positive and negative attributes used to describe 
each self-aspect, given the proportion of positive and negative attributes used across all 
self-aspects (Cramer, 1946).  Phi can range from 0 (integration; positive and negative 
attributes are evenly distributed across all subcategories) to 1 (compartmentalization; 
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either positive or negative attributes describe each subcategory).  Phi was only 
calculated if a participant’s card sort used two or more negative attributes and had three 
or more self-aspects.  Table 1 provides example card sorts for both compartmentalized 
and integrated self-structures.  For detail on the computation of phi, see Showers and 
Kevlyn (1999). 
Differential importance (DI).  Developed by Pelham and Swann (1989), DI 
assesses the relative importance of positive and negative self-aspects.  Participants were 
asked to rate the positivity, negativity, and importance of each created self-aspect on a 
scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important).  DI is the within-subject 
correlation of the positive-negative difference score for each self-aspect (i.e., positivity 
rating minus negativity rating) with the importance assigned to the self-aspect.  Scores 
can range from -1 to 1, with positive scores indicating that positive self-aspects are 
more important than negative ones (Showers, 1992).  DI was considered missing if 
there was no variability in positivity-negativity scores across the self-aspects created by 
a given participant. 
Proportion of negative attributes (neg).  This variable is the number of negative 
attributes in a participant’s card sort divided by the total number of attributes used 
across all self-aspects. 
 Coin flip task (cheating behavior).  The coin flip task developed by Bryan et 
al. (2013) assessed unethical behavior.  The task was administered online by Qualtrics 
survey software.  On the first instruction screen, participants read a brief summary of 
Bem’s (2011) article claiming scientific evidence supporting psychokinesis -- people’s 
abilities to control physical objects with their minds.  They read that many people are 
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skeptical of the results and critics believe that, as more tests on psychokinesis are done, 
the results will not be replicated.  Then participants were instructed to find a coin to flip 
10 times, while trying to influence the outcome on each flip to yield a “head.”  The 
instructions indicated that to be “properly motivated” to influence each flip, participants 
would receive $1 for each head.  The psychokinesis cover story provided a 
rationalization for cheating (i.e., the demonstration of psychokinesis) and minimized the 
participant’s perception that the experiment was actually about cheating.  Participants 
then read a second instruction screen telling them that the “laws of probability alone 
dictate” that on average people will earn $5, although some will earn as much as $10 
and as few as $0.  The ”cheater” or “cheating” prime was presented on the third 
instruction screen:  
NOTE: Please don’t (be a cheater or cheat) and report that one or more of your 
coin flips landed heads when it really landed tails! Even a small (number of 
cheaters or amount of cheating) would undermine the study, making it appear 
that psychokinesis is real. 
The manipulation repeated on the next screen, where participants also recorded the 
results of their 10 coin flips.  In capital red letters directly above the responses for each 
flip was displayed either: PLEASE DON’T CHEAT (i.e., behavior focus; cheating 
condition) or PLEASE DON’T BE A CHEATER (i.e., identity-focus; cheater condition).  
Participants in the no instruction condition did not see the third instruction screen and 
did not have the red letters displayed above the recording of flips.  The total number of 





 Self-enhancement.  The following self-report measures assess self-
enhancement.   
Narcissism.  The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-37; Emmons, 1987) 
has four subscales: Leadership/Authority, Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration, 
Superiority/Arrogance, and Exploitiveness/Entitlement.  The total score of all four 
subscales will be featured in Experiment 1.  These items measure criteria associated 
with a narcissistic personality disorder: grandiose sense of self-importance, 
preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited power and success, exhibitionism, and 
entitlement.  For each item, participants were given two statements and chose the one 
closer to their own feelings (e.g., “A. I like having authority over other people or B. I 
don’t mind following orders.”).  The total score was the sum of the 37 items indicating 
greater narcissism (α = .85, n = 107).   
 Self-deceptive enhancement. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(BIDR Version 6; Paulhus, 1994) measures conscious and unconscious socially 
desirable responding.  The BIDR has two subscales: Self-Deceptive Enhancement 
(unconscious) and Impression Management (conscious).  The Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement (SDE) subscale will be featured in Experiment 1.  SDE includes 20 items 
measuring the tendency to provide positively biased, ego enhancing responses for self-
reported items (e.g., “I always know why I like things.”).  The Impression Management 
subscale includes 20 items measuring conscious lying about performance of desirable 
behaviors (e.g., “I have never dropped litter on the street.”).  Participants indicated 
agreement with each of the 20 statements on a 7-point scale (0 = not true; 6 = very 
true).  A sum score was calculated for each extreme response (i.e., 5 or 6 response after 
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reverse scoring).  We did not extrapolate the sum score when a participant failed to 
respond to one or more items, instead assigning them a missing value (α = .62, n = 111). 
Procedure 
 Participants logged onto SONA and completed a set of measures as part of a 
departmental prescreening questionnaire for students in an introductory psychology 
course.  The prescreening questionnaire included the NPI-37 and BIDR.  After 
completing the prescreening measure, participants selected on SONA an available time 
to complete the experiment’s laboratory session.  In groups from 1 to 10, participants 
completed the card sorting task, followed by a set of paper and pencil questionnaires.  
At least 24 hours after completing the laboratory session, participants received an email 
with a website URL to complete the online portion of the experiment.  The online 
session used Qualtrics survey software for data collection and included the coin flip task 
(which Bryan et al., 2013 created for use with Qualtrics), questionnaires, demographics, 
and feedback about the experiment.  Upon opening the website URL, the Qualtrics 
software randomly assigned them to read 1 of 3 instructions (i.e., cheater, cheating, or 
no instruction).  Participants first completed the coin flip task receiving $1 for each 
head flipped.  After entering each individual flip, a separate screen asked participants to 
answer items asking how many total heads flipped and how much money earned.  Upon 
completion of the coin flip task, participants completed a series of questionnaires, 
demographics, and feedback items.
2
 Participants next selected a method of payment for 
the money they earned during the coin flip task.  They provided an email address so the 
researchers could contact them to coordinate payment.  They chose either to meet a 
research assistant at a later time to pick up cash, or to have an Amazon gift card sent to 
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the email address provided.  At the end of the online session, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed and, because of the direct deception used for the coin flip task, 
given the opportunity to exclude their data from analysis.  
Results 
Of 150 participants who began the experiment, 24 participants (16.0%) selected 
to exclude their data on the online debriefing screen.  Of the remaining 126 participants, 
12 participants (8.0%) did not complete the online part of the experiment and 1 
participant failed to follow the questionnaire instructions.  Therefore, analysis included 
113 participants (77 females).  The mean age of participants was 19.0 years (SD = 1.1).  
The racial/ethnic composition was 80.5% White, 6.2% Hispanic, 4.4% Asian, 2.7% 
Native American, 1.8% Black, and 4.4% Other.  Eleven participants had missing phi 
values because they failed to create at least 3 self-aspects or use at least 2 negative 
attributes.  Finally, 1 participant had no DI value computed because there was no 
variance in the positivity-negativity ratings between self-aspects.  Therefore, analyses 
involving self-structure used 101 participants (69 females).  Note that we completed 
additional analyses but included the significant results.  Table 2 presents the 
correlations and descriptive statistics for reported heads, self-structure, and moderators 
from Experiment 1. 
Cheating Between and Within Condition  
A one sample t-test examined whether reported heads within each of the three 
conditions fell above or below chance (i.e., heads = 5).  There was a significantly 
greater number of heads than would be expected by chance within each of the three 
conditions: no instruction (M = 5.77, SD = 1.88), t(38) = 2.55, p = .02, d = .41; cheating 
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instruction (M = 5.70, SD = 1.71), t(33) = 2.40, p = .02, d = .42; cheater instruction (M 
= 5.65, SD = 1.82), t(39) = 2.26, p = .03, d = .36.  A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) examined whether any differences between conditions and reported heads 
existed.  No difference in reported heads existed between conditions, F(2, 110) = .04, p  
= .96.  Table 3 provides a comparison of Bryan et al. (2013) and the current 
experiment’s mean reported heads.  Note that the means for the cheating and no 
instruction conditions match Bryan’s results, but those for the cheater condition differ.   
Self-Structure and Cheating   
The basic model was a hierarchical regression performed for self-structure and 
instruction variables.  The analysis of reported heads tested up to two-way interactions 
for the following four predictors: phi, DI, neg, and instruction (tested for each pair of 
conditions to avoid dummy coding).  The sample size within each condition provided a 
reliable model up to two-way interactions.  On Step 1, the main effect terms phi, DI, 
neg, and instruction were entered. These terms were mean centered (Aiken & West, 
1991). On Step 2, all two-way interactions of phi, DI, neg, and instruction were entered. 
Neg was arcsine transformed to normalize the distribution (cf. Dixon, 1960).  Table 4 
presents the basic model results for each pair of instruction conditions. 
Cheater versus no instruction.  There was a marginally significant phi main 
effect, β = .29, t(66) = 1.94, p = .06, sr
2
 = .05, such that greater compartmentalization 
was associated with more reported heads.  No other main effects or interactions existed. 
Cheater versus cheating.  There was a marginally significant phi main effect, β 
= .25, t(61) = 1.68, p = .10, sr
2
 = .04, such that greater compartmentalization was 
associated with more reported heads.  The main effect was qualified by a significant Phi 
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x Instruction interaction, β = -.28, t(60) = -2.19, p = .03, sr
2
 = .07, such that in the 
cheater condition, greater compartmentalization was associated with more reported 
heads (Figure 1).  This interaction was significant within the excluded variable model, 
which entered only the Phi x Condition term on Step 2 of the model.
 
 
Cheating versus no instruction.  There was a significant DI main effect, β = -
.31, t(60) = -2.21, p = .03, sr
2
 = .08, such that important negative self-aspects (low DI) 
were associated with more reported heads than important positive self-aspects (high 
DI). No other main effects or interactions existed.
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Self-Structure and Cheating with Moderators 
The moderator models tested how narcissism and self-deception affected the phi 
and instruction effects from the basic model.  A hierarchical regression was performed 
for self-structure, instruction, and each moderator variable.  The DI and neg variables 
were controlled as main effects only because the basic model didn’t show any 
significant interactions with these variables.  The analysis of reported heads tested up to 
two-way interactions for the following three predictors: phi, instruction, and moderator.  
The sample size within each condition provided a reliable model up to two-way 
interactions.  On Step 1, DI and neg were controlled.  On Step 2, the main effect terms 
phi, instruction, and moderator were entered.  These terms were mean centered (Aiken 
& West, 1991).  On Step 3, all two-way interactions of phi, instruction, and moderator 
were entered.  Neg was arcsine transformed to normalize the distribution.  The basic 
model analysis suggested compartmentalization effects for the cheater condition; 
therefore we present the moderator models that include the cheater instruction 
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condition.  Tables 5 and 6 present the Narcissism and SDE regression model results, 
respectively. 
Narcissism.  There were marginally significant phi main effects for both the 
cheater versus no instruction and cheater versus cheating analyses, βs ≥ .31, ts ≥ 1.87, 
ps ≤ .07, sr
2
 ≤ .08, such that greater compartmentalization was associated with more 
reported heads.  The main effect was qualified by a significant Phi x Narcissism 
interaction in the cheater versus no instruction model, β = .27, t(55) = 2.11, p = .04, sr
2
 
= .07, such that for people high in narcissism, greater compartmentalization was 
associated with more reported heads (Figure 2).   
Self-deceptive enhancement.  There were significant phi main effects for both 
the cheater versus no instruction and cheater versus cheating analyses, βs ≥ .34, ts ≥ 
2.18, ps ≤ .03, sr
2
 ≤ .08, such that greater compartmentalization was associated with 
more reported heads.  The main effects were qualified by significant Phi x Instruction 
interactions in both analyses replicating the compartmentalization effect for the cheater 
condition in the cheater versus cheating basic model analysis.  
Additionally, a consistent marginally significant Phi x SDE interaction emerges 
from both analyses.  The interaction suggests that the ethical decision context appeals to 
different people.  A plausible prediction would be that high SDE people cheat, but here 
it’s low SDE people.  This suggests that those compartmentalized people who are low 
in SDE (i.e., who don’t chronically self-enhance), might be drawn to cheat by 
demonstrating psychokinesis as a means to activate their positive compartments.  
Conversely, compartmentalized people with high SDE may not feel a need to enhance 
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in this setting as they chronically enhance everywhere else (Figure 3).  Further 
discussion of this marginal result is withheld until the General Discussion. 
Discussion 
 The results for Experiment 1 support the previously found association between 
compartmentalization and cheating under neutral conditions (Showers et al., 2015; 
Thomas, 2015).  In addition, current results extend the previous findings in several 
important ways.  First, the compartmentalization effect exists under non-neutral 
conditions, i.e., after priming a cheater self-aspect.  Second, the effect is found with a 
different procedure to assess unethical behavior.  The coin flip task eliminates the 
academic performance aspect of previous procedures (Showers et al., 2015; Thomas, 
2015) that may have tempted some people to cheat.  The arithmetic problems may have 
put additional demands on people to display average or better math ability which 
facilitated cheating.  Finally, the effect extends to unethical behavior tested in a private, 
online environment away from a laboratory setting.  This should reduce any self-
presentational concerns motivating participants to remain honest because the 
experiment was completed in a setting of their choice without any direct communication 
with the experimenter.  Without the academic performance concerns of previous 
studies, one might plausibly hypothesize that cheating would be reduced overall.  
However, the current experiments find that people who compartmentalize still cheat 
even outside of situations where academic performance concerns exist.  The current 
results are theoretically important by showing that the association between 
compartmentalization and unethical behavior generalizes beyond neutral conditions, 
academic performance, and laboratory settings. 
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Interpretation of Cheater Instructions 
One interpretation of the results is that people who compartmentalize or 
integrate may have differentially processed the “cheater” identity prime.  Presumably, 
this prime activates a self-aspect akin to “me as a cheater” which could be a threatening 
self-aspect.  For compartmentalized people to maintain an overall positive self-view, 
they may defensively process their behavior on the task to avoid negative self-
perceptions.  Therefore, cheating on the task might be construed as a behavior to which 
others are prone (a normative behavior), which suggests a less negative connotation.  
This is similar to a descriptive norm which is defined as a focus on what other people 
have done in a specific situation (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & 
Kallgren, 1993).  This type of norm narrows the impact and implications for any 
specific behavior.  In a similar fashion, people who compartmentalize may evaluate 
their own behavior only within the specific coin flip task context.  This would minimize 
the impact of cheating and promote a less critical view of inaccurately reporting the 
number of heads flipped. 
Conversely, people who integrate may read the “don’t be a cheater” instructions 
and more broadly consider whether their behavior is acceptable.  Their interpretation 
may function similarly to an injunctive norm.  This type of norm focuses on whether 
society would approve or disprove (Cialdini et al., 1990).  Unlike descriptive norms, 
injunctive norms suggest a cross-situational interpretation of what is culturally 
acceptable behavior (Reno et al., 1993).  For integrative people, the cheater instructions 
may activate a “me as a cheater” self-aspect that must be momentarily confronted.   
Their active self may therefore contain negative self-attributes of a cheater self, while 
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simultaneously holding positive self-beliefs if they remain honest.  Much like an 
injunctive norm, integrative people may generalize the cheater instructions as reflecting 
who they are more generally, not simply behavior specific to the coin flip task.  In this 
way, people who integrate confront the negative implications of being a cheater on the 
coin flip task and behave honestly.     
Interpretation of Psychokinesis Cover Story 
  An alternative explanation of the findings is that certain people ignored the 
“don’t be a cheater” warning and instead felt a type of experimental demand given the 
psychokinesis cover story.  The introduction of psychokinesis during the coin flip 
instructions tells participants that “many people are skeptical [of psychokinesis]. Critics 
generally agree that, as more studies are conducted, the findings will not hold up.”  
Some people may have read that statement and inferred how they were expected to 
behave.  The language makes it plausible that an experimental demand may have 
motivated certain people to find support for (or against) psychokinesis.     
The experimental demand to prove psychokinesis may have especially tempted 
people who compartmentalize to cheat.  They may have felt threatened if they failed to 
demonstrate psychokinesis.  A defensive response may ensue this potential self-threat.  
People who compartmentalize may process their behavior in a biased fashion, by 
isolating and avoiding negative implications for cheating, as a means to self-enhance 
(cf. von Hippel et al., 2005; Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014).  In this way, cheating on the 
coin flip task can be processed in a positive light as demonstrating a skill (namely, 
psychokinesis) or as a means of receiving extra money.  This allows people who 
compartmentalize to avoid any negative implications of being a cheater; quite the 
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contrary, their dishonest behavior can be self-enhancing.  The finding that narcissistic 
people who compartmentalize cheat the most supports a self-enhancement 
interpretation.  These people would be most likely to exploit the task to show superior 
ability or feel entitled to the most amount of money. 
On the other hand, people who integrate are motivated to portray the self 
accurately (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014), promoting greater honesty.  Integratives may 
resist the temptation to cheat provided by the psychokinesis cover story because they 
process how dishonest behavior would negatively impact the self.  Unlike the self-
enhancement motive for people who compartmentalize, integratives seek an accurate 
assessment of their behavior on the coin flip.  They confront how cheating would affect 
the experimental results (and reflect on the self), resulting in more honest behavior.   
Coin Flip Procedure Validity   
The finding that narcissistic people who compartmentalize report the most heads 
flipped supports the validity of the online coin flip task.  It is reasonable to consider that 
narcissistic people may behave dishonestly when there is a benefit for the self.  They 
likely feel comfortable exploiting the coin flip task to affirm feelings of superiority and 
entitlement.  Narcissistic people who compartmentalize may use those feelings to avoid 
any negative implications of cheating for the self.  Instead they may interpret their 
additional heads as self-enhancing (e.g., a display of superior psychokinesis).  They 
may also feel a sense of entitlement to receive the most amount of money possible.  The 
perception of coercion to participate in experiments as required for course credit may 
foster such entitlement, especially in narcissistic people.  Conversely, narcissistic 
people who integrate may reinforce a feeling of moral superiority by behaving with 
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honesty on the coin flip task.  In both cases, narcissists affirm their inflated sense of 
self, but only compartmentalized people deny the negative implications of cheating and 
use a more dubious means to achieve their feelings of superiority. 
Implications 
These results suggest support for the notion that when primed with a “cheater” 
identity, people who compartmentalize avoid negative self-perceptions which facilitates 
unethical behavior.  They may defensively process the cheater self-aspect and interpret 
cheating on the coin flip task in terms of how the behavior benefits the self.  People who 
compartmentalize may process their behavior in positive terms such as: they helped the 
experimenter prove psychokinesis; they displayed superior psychokinetic ability; or 
they earned extra money.  In these ways, they avoid a drop in self-worth that the cheater 
self-aspect might imply.  Interestingly, Thomas (2015) finds a result that under 
conditions of ego-depletion, people who integrate cheat at a higher rate than people who 
compartmentalize.  However, the current results suggest that other, non-neutral 
conditions exist where compartmentalization is associated with cheating (namely when 
priming a “cheater” self-aspect).  The competing result from Thomas (2015) may reflect 
a result unique to ego-depletion and people who integrate.  Experiment 2 introduces 
another situational factor to understand better the type of situations for which 
integrative people remain resilient against temptations to cheat. 
Limitations and Issues 
Comparison to Bryan et al. (2013).  Although the present results don’t find a 
main effect between conditions, the self-structure and condition interactions do support 
Bryan and colleagues’ cheater condition findings.  Specifically, when primed with a 
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“cheater” identity (cheater condition), people who integrate report a similar number of 
heads flipped as Bryan and colleagues’ cheater condition results.  Both experiments find 
people in the cheater condition (only integratives in the current experiment) report 
heads at a rate not significantly greater than chance (i.e., 5.0 heads flipped).  In addition, 
the number of reported heads in the cheater condition for people who compartmentalize 
falls well above that which Bryan and colleagues find in any of their analyses.   
The lack of between-condition effects may be explained by sample differences 
between the current experiment and Bryan et al.’s.  The current experiment’s sample 
came from an introductory psychology course whereas Bryan and colleagues used a 
community-based online participant pool.  The participants in the current experiment 
received both course credit and money, and tended to be younger than Bryan’s sample.  
Bryan’s sample chose to participate in that study with only a monetary expectation and 
no course requirement.  On the other hand, participants in the current experiment may 
have felt coerced into completing the experiment given the course credit requirement.  
They may have used this coercion as a justification to award themselves unearned 
money (with the exception of integrative people in the cheater condition).  With regard 
to age, the current experiment’s sample had a mean age of 19 years old compared to 
Bryan’s mean ages of 40 (Study 2) and 23 (Study 3).  It could be that, over time, people 
become less defensive and more stable with regard to their self-concept, and Bryan 
simply had fewer compartmentalized people in his sample.   
Participant exclusion.  Another issue with the current experiment was the 
number of participants (16.0%) who chose to exclude their data from analysis.  
Participants provided their full name as a signature as part of the debriefing.  They also 
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actively selected whether to have their data included or excluded.  A general defensive 
response upon learning that the experiment tested honesty may have also contributed to 
the high rate of exclusion.  The online nature of the experiment should reduce 
participant’s concern about identification while engaged in coin flip task.  However, 
after participants revealed their full name and learned the true meaning of the coin flip 
task, they may have felt uneasy or threatened.  Therefore, the best way to ensure they 
were not found to cheat was to exclude their data from analysis.  A less invasive 
debriefing procedure could alleviate concerns about participant identification.  
Experiment 2 attempts to resolve the debriefing exclusion issue. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 is to replicate the compartmentalization effect 
previously found under conditions that prime a cheater self-aspect.  In addition, a 
situational manipulation presents participants with greater or less temptation to cheat 
during the coin flip task.  This explores whether integrative people remain resilient and 
relatively honest when presented a more tempting situation to cheat; and whether 
compartmentalized people behave more honestly when presented a less tempting 
situation to cheat.  The manipulation attempts to replicate previous research that self-
reflective primes reduce dishonesty (i.e., time; Gino & Mogilner, 2013).  Finally, the 
debriefing procedure is updated to reduce the unusually high number of participants that 
selected to exclude their data from analysis.  Before proposing Experiment 2, we review 
existing research that establishes how situational factors affect unethical behavior.  
 Situational Influences of Ethical Behavior 
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As first suggested by Hartshorne and May (1928), other researchers provide 
evidence that situational factors influence unethical behavior.  A classic example is 
Milgram’s (1974) study on obedience. His study shows that under conditions with 
expectations to obey an authority figure, people followed orders that could be perceived 
as potentially fatal for someone else.  However, research has also found situational 
factors that can affect more commonplace types of unethical behavior. 
Other people’s behavior.  Research has demonstrated that people may adjust 
their own behavior by merely observing the behavior of others.  Bandura and 
colleagues’ “Bobo doll” study found that children would mimic aggressive behavior 
against a doll after they observed an adult behave in an aggressive manner towards the 
doll (Bandura, Ross, Ross, 1961).  Bandura’s social learning theory suggested that a 
person’s behavior could be influenced by observing the behavioral cues of others.  
Indeed, recent research found that people cheated to make extra money after witnessing 
a perceived ingroup member cheat in a similar fashion (i.e., the confederate wore a 
sweatshirt depicting the participant’s school).  Interestingly, this result did not hold 
when the confederate was perceived as an outgroup member; in that case, people were 
more honest (Gino, Ayal, Ariely, 2009).  In a related result, people changed their 
behavior and attitudes when they felt psychologically closer to another person who 
behaved unethically.  When psychologically closer, people made less harsh judgment of 
the other’s actions and behaved more unethically themselves (Gino & Galinsky, 2012).  
The authors described this phenomenon as vicarious dishonesty.  The previous studies 
suggested that the perception of others’ unethical behavior communicated a 
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permissiveness and justification of the behavior, which facilitated similarly unethical 
behavior for oneself.   
Ego-depletion.  Research suggests that people are more likely to behave 
unethically after they exhaust self-control resources (e.g., ego-depletion; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 
2011).  After people exhaust their capacity to exert self-control, they cheat to gain 
additional money more often and to a greater extent than non-depleted people.  
Depleted people are also more likely to put themselves in situations that tempt cheating 
and, thus, engage in more cheating as well (Mead et al., 2009).  In addition, people who 
resist the temptation to cheat expend self-control resources to do so (Gino et al., 2011).  
This phenomenon is not limited to the laboratory setting.  Kouchaki and Smith’s (2014) 
“morning morality effect” (p. 1) shows that people are more likely to behave unethically 
in the afternoon than in the morning.  Their findings also show that normal, everyday 
tasks deplete self-control resources and explain why unethical behavior increases later 
in the day.  Likewise, a diary study of people’s sleep patterns shows a positive 
relationship between unethical behavior and less sleep (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & 
Ghumman, 2011).  In the diary study, the association is mediated by cognitive fatigue 
(i.e., ego-depletion).   
Reduced identification.  People are more likely to behave in unethical ways 
when they perceive greater anonymity for their actions.  For instance, when people 
experience darkness and perceive a reduction in others’ ability to identify them, self-
interested behavior becomes disinhibited (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010).  The authors 
demonstrate this phenomenon by manipulating the amount of light in a room or the type 
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of glasses participants wear while completing the previously described math task.  
Under conditions of increased illusory anonymity (i.e., when the room was dimmer or 
when participants wore sunglasses as opposed to clear lenses) people behave in a more 
self-interested manner, cheating to a greater extent on a math task.  Zhong and 
colleagues (2010) conclude that under conditions where people perceive greater 
concealment of identity, they feel licensed to cheat.  In a similar vein, another study 
finds that participants cheat to a greater extent when they perceive wearing counterfeit 
sunglasses compared to authentic sunglasses (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010).  Of note, 
the authors also find that feeling inauthentic about the self (i.e., feeling out of touch 
with the “real me”) mediates the effect of wearing counterfeit sunglasses on cheating.   
Time versus money.  Situations that evoke the concept of time or money can 
predict ethical or unethical behavior.  Research suggests that people can hold dissonant 
attitudes toward the concept of money.  Depending on the context, money can elicit 
greed, exploitation, and self-serving attitudes; or fairness and reciprocity (Yang, Wu, 
Zhou, Mead, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2013).  However, previous studies support the 
former as the most readily accessible money-related concepts.  In general, the concept 
of money seems to be a temptation for people to behave unethically, often in a self-
interested manner.  For instance, people primed with an image of money (i.e., an image 
of paper money on a computer’s screen saver) work harder on a difficult task and want 
to take on more of the work, but also reduce their helpfulness toward others and 
increase isolationist behavior (Vohs, Mead, & Good, 2008).  Moreover, activating the 
concept of money is associated with an impersonal, economic input-output (e.g., market 
utility) mindset which promotes personal achievement over social engagement (Vohs et 
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al, 2008) and self-sufficient, yet socially insensitive, outcomes (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 
2006).  These results suggest that priming the concept of money increases self-
interested behavior while limiting attention to interpersonal cues that may help monitor 
the self.  The current experiment uses a money prime to increase participants’ 
temptation to behave unethically. 
On the other hand, the concept of time is associated with self-reflection and 
greater prosocial behavior.  In a study by Mogilner (2010), participants at a coffee shop 
primed with the concept of time (as opposed to money) choose to spend more time 
socializing with others and less time working alone.  The decision to spend time with 
others is associated with increased self-reported happiness.  Other studies find similar 
results by priming the concept of time: people report an increase in concern for 
emotional meaning (Liu & Aaker, 2007), an increase in happiness through interpersonal 
relationships (e.g., charitable giving; Liu & Aaker, 2008), and greater social 
engagement (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009).  These studies suggest that priming time may 
increase a person’s concern for others’ well-being and how others perceive them.  These 
concerns may bring to mind that cheating may negatively impact others, such as falsely 
helping the researchers show support for psychokinesis or taking unearned money that 
may instead go to someone else.  Under conditions of self-reflection the temptation to 
cheat might be reduced because a person can no longer avoid processing the negative 
self-implications for unethical behavior.  The current experiment uses the concept of 
time as a way to reduce cheating on the coin flip task. 
Previous research has established that priming money or time influenced ethical 
behavior.  People were more likely to cheat when solving arithmetic problems when 
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primed with money as opposed to time (Gino & Mogilner, 2013).  The authors found 
this association consistently using various operationalizations of money and time 
primes.  For instance, the results held using various procedures to affect the prime, 
including sentence unscrambling or searching for song lyrics about either money or 
time.  These studies suggested that activating money or time concepts influence 
prosocial or unethical behavior.  Specifically, priming the concept of money 
presumably increased focus on improving economically and reduced concern with how 
others may perceive you, increasing the temptation to cheat.  On the other hand, 
priming the concept of time increased self-reflection and the concern with how others 
perceived you, reducing the temptation to cheat.  The current experiment explored the 
relationship between self-structure and unethical behavior under conditions of greater or 
less temptation to cheat. 
Overview and Predictions 
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to replicate the positive relationship between 
compartmentalization and unethical behavior.  Previous research establishes the positive 
association between compartmentalization and cheating under neutral conditions 
(Showers et al., 2015; Thomas, 2015).  Experiment 2 also explores the resilience of 
integrative people in situations with a greater temptation to cheat.  For instance, Thomas 
(2015) found that under conditions of ego-depletion, integrative people cheated more 
than compartmentalized people.  In order to test whether integrative people fall prey to 
temptation beyond ego-depletion conditions, Experiment 2 provides 3 contexts with 
varying degrees of temptation.  Finally, the debriefing exclusion issue is addressed in 
two ways.  First, the signature provided is changed so participants input only their 
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initials to indicate they’ve read the debriefing form.  Second, participants must actively 
select to have their data excluded; the default selection is that their data be included.   
We predict a replication from Experiment 1, such that compartmentalized 
people will cheat more than integrative people in neutral conditions (Showers, et al., 
2015; Thomas, 2015) and after a “cheater” identity prime.  In addition, we vary the 
temptation to cheat using a prime of money (greater temptation), time (less temptation), 
or no prime (neutral condition).  Previous research finds that priming self-reflection 
using the concept of time results in greater honesty (Gino & Mogilner, 2013).  
Therefore, our basic prediction is that in a situation with greater temptation (money) 
people will cheat more compared to a less tempting situation (time).  Furthermore, self-
structure may interact with the varying levels of temptation.  It seems plausible that 
people who integrate may generally be more sensitive to ethical-behavior-related 
manipulations and fall prey to temptation (similar to ego-depletion conditions; Thomas, 
2015).  However, research has shown that priming money can counteract ego-depletion 
effects (Boucher & Kofos, 2012).  Specifically, ego-depleted people primed with money 
concepts perform better at subsequent effortful tasks (e.g., a Stroop task).  The authors 
find evidence that money reduces the perceived difficulty and effort needed to complete 
these tasks.  People who integrate may recover any previously lost self-control 
resources when primed with money and remain relatively honest compared to people 
who compartmentalize.  Therefore, we predict that people who integrate remain vigilant 
under conditions of greater temptation (money) and remain relatively honest compared 
to people who compartmentalize.     
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Finally, we analyze individual difference variables that may moderate the 
compartmentalization effect.  The specific moderators, self-deceptive enhancement 
(SDE) and shame proneness, conceptually reflect a tendency to cheat.  We include both 
constructs because it is difficult to predict for which measure people will be most 
sensitive within the current paradigm.  It seems plausible that greater self-deceptive 
enhancement or less shame proneness predicts unethical behavior.  Furthermore, we 
predict that self-enhancing people who compartmentalize cheat more than their 
integrative counterparts.  This should be especially true under conditions of greater 
temptation (money prime).  Additionally, the tendency to see oneself as a bad person 
(shame prone) after behaving unethically should promote more honesty during the coin 
flip task.  This might be especially prominent when priming time.  The influence of 
self-reflection and shame proneness may result in greater honesty especially in people 
who may otherwise cheat (i.e., compartmentalized or self-enhancing).  Therefore we 
predict that under conditions that prime time (self-reflection) shame prone 
compartmentalized people override their tendency to cheat and remain honest.  
Method 
Participants  
 The sample was 309 undergraduate students (211 females) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course.  Participants volunteered to complete the experiment 
on SONA in partial fulfillment of a course research participation requirement.  In 
addition, participants received a monetary incentive for performance in the online 




 Experiment 2 is conceptually a 2 (self-structure: integrative or 
compartmentalized) x 2 (instruction condition: cheater or no instruction) x 3 
(background condition: money, time, or gray) design.  The self-structure measure is a 
continuous individual difference variable, whereas the instruction and background 
conditions are manipulated between participants.  When including the self-structure 
variables as predictors, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis tests the main effects 
and up to three-way interactions.  The instruction and background condition variables 
are analyzed using an ANOVA.  These variables are also included as separate terms in 
the regression analyses. 
Measures 
Self-structure card sorting task.  The card-sorting task was the same as in  
Experiment 1. 
Coin flip task (cheating behavior).  As in Experiment 1, Bryan et al.’s (2013) 
coin flip task assessed dishonest behavior.  Experiment 2 included the cheater (i.e., 
identity-focus) and no instruction conditions.  Participants viewed one of three 
backgrounds while completing the coin flip task: solid gray (control), a wallpaper image 
of $100 bills (money prime), or a wallpaper image of pocket watches (time prime; see 
Figure 4).  
Self-deceptive enhancement.  As in Experiment 1, the BIDR-SDE (Paulhus, 
1994) measured a person’s tendency to unconsciously bias their responses to enhance 
one’s ego (α = .70, n = 277).   
 Shame proneness.  The Test of Self-Conscious Affect Scale (TOSCA-3 short 
version) measures the experience of shame and guilt in response to various scenarios.  
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The TOSCA-3 short version has four subscales: Shame Proneness, Guilt Proneness, 
Externalization, and Detachment/Unconcern.  A scenario is presented that contains four 
different ways people might react.  Participants report their likelihood to react in each of 
the four different ways; each reaction represents one of the subscales.  The Shame 
Proneness subscale will be featured in Experiment 2.  It includes 11 items measuring 
one’s negative evaluation of the self for the given scenario (e.g., Scenario: “While 
playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.” Reaction: “You 
would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a ball.”).  Participants indicate the 
likelihood of their reaction on a 5-point scale (1 = not likely; 5 = very likely).  The 
Shame Proneness subscale is the sum of the 11 items indicating greater shame (α = .74, 
n = 303). 
Free market outcome fairness.  The Fair Market Ideology Scale (FMI; Jost et 
al., 2003) measures the tendency to believe that the existing free market system is fair.  
The FMI has two subscales: Procedural Fairness and Outcome Fairness.  The Outcome 
Fairness (FMOF) subscale will be featured in Experiment 2.  It includes 10 scenarios 
measuring perceptions of fairness for market-driven outcomes (e.g., “When concessions 
at airports and concerts charge higher prices for beverages because they know that their 
customers have no alternatives, it is…”).  Participants indicate agreement with each of 
the 10 scenarios on an 11-point scale (-5 = completely unfair; 5 = completely fair).  
FMOF is the mean response of the 10 scenarios indicating greater fairness (α = .80, n = 
278).   
The FMOF measure looks at potential rationalizations after unethical behavior.  
Previous research has established that priming money increases acceptance of free-
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market capitalism and exploiting disadvantaged groups (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & 
Waytz, 2013).  Therefore, it seems plausible to predict that cheating increases 
subsequent belief in FMOF.  People increase their belief in FMOF to reflect having 
taken advantage of the opportunity to optimize money earned by cheating.  This effect 
should be most pronounced under conditions of greater temptation (i.e., money 
background). 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1, except for the addition of a 
background manipulation for the online session and the TOSCA-3 and FMI measures.  
The TOSCA-3 was included in the departmental prescreening.  In groups from 1 to 14, 
participants completed the card sorting task, followed by the same set of paper and 
pencil questionnaires as in Experiment 1.  Before participants began the online session, 
Qualtrics software randomly assigned them to read 1 of 2 instructions (cheater or no 
instructions), and to view 1 of 3 backgrounds (money, time, or gray).  After completing 
the coin flip task, the background was gray for the remainder of the online session.  The 
online session included the FMOF measure within a larger group of questionnaires after 
the coin flip task.  At the end of the online session participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and, because of the direct deception used for the coin flip task, given the 




Of 309 participants who began Experiment 2, 2 participants selected to exclude 
their data on the online debriefing screen.  Of the remaining 307 participants, 28 
persons (9.1%) did not complete the online part of the experiment and 1 person 
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completed only the online part of the experiment.  Therefore, analyses included 278 
participants (198 females).  The mean age of participants was 18.7 years (SD = 1.5).  
The racial/ethnic composition was 74.1% White, 10.8% Asian, 5.4% Hispanic, 4.0% 
Black, 2.5% Native American, and 3.2% Other.  Thirty-one participants had missing phi 
values because they failed to create at least 3 self-aspects or use at least 2 negative 
attributes.  Finally, 2 participants had no DI value computed because there was no 
variance in the positivity-negativity ratings between self-aspects.  Therefore, analyses 
including measures of self-structure used 245 participants (177 females).  Note that we 
completed additional analyses but included the significant results.  Table 7 presents the 
correlations and descriptive statistics for reported heads, self-structure, and moderator 
variables for Experiment 2. 
Cheating Between Conditions: Sum of All Trials 
A one sample t-test examined whether reported heads within each of the 2 
(instruction: cheater or no instruction) x 3 (background: money, time, or gray) 
conditions fell above or below chance (5 reported heads).  There was a significantly 
greater number of reported heads than would be expected by chance within five of the 
six conditions, ts ≥ 2.359, ps ≤ .02, ds ≥ .35; the cheater-gray condition reported only 
marginally more than five reported heads, t (46) = 1.944, p = .06, d = .28. Next, a 2 
(instruction) x 3 (background) ANOVA examined whether differences in reported heads 
existed between conditions.  There was a significant main effect for instruction, F (1, 
272) = 11.60, p = .00, η² = .04, such that people reported fewer heads after reading the 
cheater instructions compared to no instruction. There were no significant effects for 
background, F (2, 272) = .48, p = .62, or the Instruction x Background interaction, F (2, 
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272) = .64, p = .53.  Table 8 shows descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for 
reported heads.   
Cheating Between Conditions: Individuals Trials 1 to 10 
 As a follow up analysis we ran 2 (instruction) x 3 (background) ANOVAs to test 
whether differences existed by condition within each of the ten trials.  To summarize, 
there was a significant instruction main effect for trials 1 and 2 (combined), F (1, 272) = 
5.89, p = .02, η² = .02, such that people reported fewer heads on trials 1 and 2 in the 
cheater condition than in no instruction.  The main effect was qualified by a marginally 
significant Instruction x Background interaction, F (2, 272) = 2.47, p = .09, η² = .02.  
People in the cheater-time condition reported fewer heads on trial 1 and 2, whereas the 
other groups reported more heads (Table 9).  This result suggests people in the cheater-
time condition initially behaved in the predicted direction while viewing time 
background (i.e., more honestly).  Also, there was a significant Instruction x 
Background interaction for trials 6 and 7 (combined), F (2, 272) = 3.22, p = .04, η² = 
.02.  People in the cheater-time condition reported more heads on trials 6 and 7 (Table 
10).   
Taken together, the follow-up ANOVAs suggest that reading the cheater 
instructions while viewing the time background delayed people’s cheating until trials 6 
and 7.  On these trials people may have reported additional heads making up for their 
previous honesty on flips 1 and 2.  However, on all ten trials people reading the cheater 
instructions still remained relatively more honest than those in the no instruction 
condition.  Figure 5 presents bar charts of mean heads reported for all ten trials, trials 1 
and 2, and trials 6 and 7 respectively. 
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Self-structure and Cheating 
The basic model was a hierarchical regression performed for self-structure, 
instruction, and background variables.  The analysis of reported heads tested up to 
three-way interactions for the following five predictors:  phi, DI, neg, instruction, and 
background.  On Step 1, the main effect terms phi, DI, neg, instruction, and background 
were entered. These terms were mean centered (Aiken & West, 1991). On Step 2, all 
two-way interactions of phi, DI, neg, instruction, and background were entered. On Step 
3, all three-way interactions of phi, DI, neg, instruction, and background were entered. 
Two participants had extremely high neg values; these values were winsorized to the 
next highest value (cf. Dixon, 1960).  Neg was arcsine transformed to normalize the 
distribution.  Figure 6 presents the frequency distributions for reported heads and the 
self-structure variables.  
 Preliminary analyses of the basic model for all possible pairs of backgrounds 
within each instruction condition suggested that effects within the gray condition 
differed from those within the time and money conditions (which were similar).  In fact, 
these analyses suggested that, overall, the time background may have been perceived 
like a money prime (possibly because the watches looked expensive).  Therefore, the 
overall regression model tested the background conditions coded as follows: money or 
time = 0; gray = 1.  If a variable had no significant interaction terms  (p < .05)  we 
analyzed a trimmed basic model removing all of the variable’s two- and three- way 
interaction terms to reduce model complexity and multicollinearity.  In all cases, we 
examined the complete and trimmed models.  The trimmed model sometimes reduced 
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significant effects to marginal ones; therefore, the stronger results are presented in the 
text with the alternative analysis in the appendix.     
Trimmed basic model (money/time versus gray).  There were no significant 
background or instruction interactions in the overall basic model.  Therefore, we tested 
a regression model removing all two- and three- way interaction terms for the 
instruction or background variables.  Table 11 presents the trimmed basic model 
regression results.  There was a significant main effects for instruction, β = .23, t(239) = 
3.65, p = .00, sr
2
 = .05, such that reading the cheater instructions was associated with 
fewer reported heads.  There was a marginal phi main effect, β = .12, t(239) = 1.74, p = 
.08, sr
2
 = .01, such that greater compartmentalization was associated with more reported 
heads.  These main effects were qualified by a significant Phi x Neg interaction, β = -
.14, t(235) = -2.08, p = .04, sr
2
 = .02, such that for low neg, greater 
compartmentalization was associated with more reported heads (Figure 7).  For sake of 
completeness, Appendix C presents the untrimmed basic model analysis. 
Basic model (money versus time).  Given that we were not expecting 
differences in the basic model for money and time, we ran the money versus time basic 
model regression for sake of completeness.  Table 12 presents the regression results.  
The main effects were the same as the money/time versus gray basic model for 
instruction and phi.  The main effects were qualified by a significant Phi x DI x Neg 
interaction, β = -.26, t(144) = -2.09, p = .04, sr
2
 = .03.  The interaction conceptually 
replicated the above Phi x Neg interaction suggesting that for low neg, greater 
compartmentalization was associated with more reported heads.  Additionally, the 
interaction suggested that the most negative integration (i.e., low DI, high neg) was 
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associated with the fewest reported heads of any group (Figure 8).  This analysis 
presents the complete model; the trimmed model is in Appendix D. 
Self-structure and Cheating with Moderators 
 The basic model suggested that the money and time backgrounds may have been 
perceived similarly by the sample as a whole.  However, preliminary analyses with 
moderators suggested that some people did differentiate between money and time; 
therefore we presented money versus time comparisons for the moderator analyses.  
Because a Phi x Neg interaction existed in the basic model, the moderator models 
included neg but controlled for DI. 
The moderator model was a hierarchical regression performed for self-structure, 
instruction, background, and the moderator variable.  The analysis of reported heads 
(cheating) tested up to three-way interactions for the following five predictors: phi, neg, 
instruction, background, and moderator.  On Step 1, the DI variable was entered to 
control for any main effect.  On Step 2, the main effect predictor terms phi, neg, 
instruction, background, and moderator were entered. These terms were mean centered 
(Aiken & West, 1991). On Step 3, all two-way interactions of phi, neg, instruction, 
background, and moderator were entered. On Step 4, all three-way interactions of phi, 
neg, instruction, background, and moderator were entered. Two participants had 
extremely high neg values; these values were winsorized to the next closest value (cf. 
Dixon, 1960).   Neg was arcsine transformed to normalize the distribution.  As 
explained above, for each model that had a variable with no significant interaction terms  
(p < .05),  we analyzed a trimmed model removing all of that variable’s two- and three- 
way interaction terms to reduce model complexity and multicollinearity.  In all cases we 
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looked at the complete and trimmed models, reporting the model with stronger effects.  
The appendices present the alternative model.  Tables 13 to 15 present the time versus 
money moderator model regression results for three moderators: self-deceptive 
enhancement, shame proneness, and free market outcome fairness respectively. 
Self-deceptive enhancement (money versus time).  The main effects for 
instruction, phi, and neg remained the same as the basic model.  The main effects were 
qualified by a significant Phi x Background x SDE interaction, β = .24, t(123) = -2.21, p 
= .03, sr
2
 = .04, such that for high SDE in the money condition, greater 
compartmentalization was associated with more reported heads (Figure 9). For highly 
self-deceptive people who compartmentalize, priming money increased cheating.  This 
analysis presents the complete model; the trimmed model is in Appendix E.  
Shame proneness (money versus time).  The instruction main effect remained 
the same as in previous models.  In addition, there were significant main effects for phi, 
β = .17, t(168) = 2.09, p = .04, sr
2
 = .03; and shame proneness, β = -.19, t(168) = -2.59, 
p = .01, sr
2
 = .04, such that compartmentalization and less shame proneness were 
associated with more reported heads.  There were no significant two- or three-way 
interactions.  Note that, by controlling for shame proneness, we obtained a main effect 
association between compartmentalization and greater cheating across both cheater and 
no instruction conditions. 
 Free market outcome fairness (money versus time).  The significant 
instruction and marginally significant phi main effects remained the same as previous 
models.  The main effects were qualified by a significant Instruction x Background x 
FMOF interaction, β = -.16, t(143) = -2.00, p = .05, sr
2
 = .03, such that for low FMOF 
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in the money condition, the cheater instructions were associated with fewer reported 
heads than were no instructions (Figure 10).  For people without their self-concept 
primed who also believe in less fairness of free-market outcomes, priming money 
increased cheating.  This analysis presents the complete model; the trimmed model is in 
Appendix F.  
Discussion 
The results for Experiment 2 provide further evidence for the association 
between compartmentalization and greater cheating.  Results support the main effect 
association between compartmentalization and cheating found previously under neutral 
conditions (Showers et al., 2015; Thomas, 2015).  In addition, compartmentalized 
people who describe themselves using fewer negative self-attributes also cheated more 
than integrative people.  The main effect association between the cheater identity prime 
(i.e., cheater instructions) and less cheating conceptually replicates the Bryan et al. 
(2013) results.  However, there is no direct replication of the Experiment 1 result 
showing that integrative people behave more honestly after the “cheater” identity prime.  
Instead, Experiment 2 finds that the “cheater” identity prime and an integrative self-
structure separately predict more honest behavior.  It should be noted that controlling 
for shame proneness strengthens the main effect association between 
compartmentalization and cheating.  Also, as predicted, the results reveal that shame 
proneness predicts greater honesty.  This relationship is not qualified by any results with 
regards to self-structure or temptation.  The experience of shame may separately 
motivate people to hide and avoid, or blame others (Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez, 
2014).  Shame prone people may apply behavioral avoidance and reject cheating on 
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their coin flips.  Thus, the shame proneness result suggests an avenue where the 
experience of shame can be constructive, namely, when it deters unethical behavior.   
Another purpose of Experiment 2 is to examine cheating under conditions of 
greater or less temptation (i.e., money versus time).  The results provide some evidence 
for the predicted positive association between greater temptation and cheating.  
Specifically, after the “cheater” identity prime, people in the less tempting situation 
(time prime) report fewer heads on flips 1 and 2.   This suggests people delay their 
cheating on the task under less tempting circumstances.  With regard to self-structure, 
we find no evidence that integrative people fall prey to cheating under conditions of 
greater temptation.  In addition, the moderator analysis reveals that certain 
compartmentalized people cheat more under conditions of greater temptation.  
Specifically, highly self-deceptive (SDE) people who compartmentalize cheat more 
than high SDE people who integrate under conditions of greater temptation.   
Implications 
The results of Experiment 2 provide additional support for the notion that people 
who compartmentalize behave more unethically than people who integrate.  We do not 
find evidence that people who integrate cheat more than people who compartmentalize 
under conditions of greater temptation.  Our findings suggest a narrow interpretation of 
the ego-depletion effects Thomas (2015) finds for people who integrate.  She discusses 
the ego-depletion results as an ironic effect for people who integrate.  Because they 
usually avoid situations that tempt unethical behavior, they have little practice resisting 
such temptation.  As a result, people who integrate may fall prey to temptation once 
ego-depleted because they have yet to strengthen the cognitive muscle needed to defend 
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against ego-depletion effects under conditions of greater temptation (cf. Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007).  It seems that 
the ironic effect for integratives occurs under conditions of ego-depletion with a 
relatively more effortful task.  A different situational temptation and less demanding 
task provide no evidence that people who integrate behave more unethically than people 
who compartmentalize.   
Furthermore, individual difference effects provided support for the interpretation 
that integrative people remain resilient against conditions of greater temptation.  
Specifically, high SDE people who compartmentalize cheated the most when primed 
with money.  This finding suggests that they avoided processing any negative 
connotations for cheating.  Instead, they may have used the task to self-enhance by 
demonstrating superior psychokinesis or receiving better-than-average money.  
Moreover, it seems plausible these people use any possible rationalization for unethical 
behavior.  The presence of money might especially put these people in an economic 
mindset where maximum financial gains justify any unethical behavior that results in 
additional pay.  
The individual flip analyses suggest that the time prime may delay cheating until 
later flips.  Specifically, we find that after the cheater identity prime, people viewing the 
time prime report fewer heads on flips 1 and 2.  These same people also report more 
heads on flips 6 and 7.  When accounting for all ten flips, there is no difference in 
cheating between the initially honest people in the time-cheater condition and the other 
conditions.  The pattern of early honesty, later cheating might be a type of moral 
credentialing (Monin & Miller, 2001) for people primed with time and a “cheater” 
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identity (time-cheater condition).  In this case, after remaining honest after the first few 
flips people may feel that their moral self is affirmed, providing a rationalization for 
them to behave unethically on later flips.   
Limitations and Issues 
In Experiment 1, a large segment of people (16.0%) selected that their data be 
excluded.  The data for Experiment 2 suggested the changes to the debriefing procedure 
alleviated this problem.  In fact, only 2 of the original 309 participants (.01%) selected 
their data for exclusion.  The specific improvements that participants provided only 
their initials as a signature and actively selected a button online for their data to be 
excluded appeared to fix the issue.   
Time and money background images.  The failure to find strong background 
manipulation effects for all ten flips may be explained by the images used in the current 
experiment.  The preliminary analyses suggested the gray background was perceived 
differently than the time and money backgrounds.  In general the time and money 
backgrounds appeared to be evoking a similar response for most participants.  The 
current images were selected to provide backgrounds that superficially looked similar.  
This helped the images appear less obvious as a manipulation in the study.  Another 
consideration was whether the images worked as a background image in the Qualtrics 
computer program.  Therefore, we used as equivalent an image as possible of currency 
and time pieces scattered about the page.  However, the image of time depicted with 
pocket watches may have been perceived as expensive or wealthy by most participants 
(see Figure 4 for the images).  If perceived as wealth, participants may have fallen prey 
to an abundance effect as described by Gino and Pierce (2009).  The authors found that 
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people behaved unethically when in the presence of monetary wealth.  In their studies, 
the depiction of abundant wealth provoked feelings of envy in their participants that led 
to unethical behavior.  It’s plausible that the vast majority of participants never 
possessed a pocket watch like those depicted in the current experiment.  As a result they 
may have focused on the abundance of expensive looking watches with a shiny gold or 
silver finish.  A better self-reflective prime might have been to use an image of digital 
clocks or clock faces without a shiny finish prime. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The first goal of the current experiments was to replicate the association 
between compartmentalization and cheating using an online paradigm unrelated to 
academic performance.  We find support for the positive association between 
compartmentalization and unethical behavior under neutral conditions across two 
experiments.  Both experiments find a main effect between compartmentalization and 
cheating in the predicted direction.  Now replicated across numerous studies, the 
consistent results suggest that people who defensively process negative self-beliefs also 
defensively process the implications for unethical behavior.  The extension of previous 
results into different unethical behavior procedures broadens the scope of the self-
structure model to predict unethical behavior.  Previously, only academic performance 
tasks (i.e., arithmetic problems) in a laboratory setting assessed unethical behavior 
within a self-structure framework.  The coin flip procedure provides a different 
unethical behavior as a dependent variable, unrelated to math ability and in an online 
environment outside of a laboratory.  Thus, compartmentalization predicting unethical 
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behavior appears to generalize across different unethical behavior procedures and study 
settings.  
The self-structure model provides a mechanism that may explain how other 
individual differences predict unethical behavior.  For instance, defensive processing of 
negative self-beliefs may result in avoidance of negative emotions like guilt or shame.  
It seems plausible that people with compartmentalized selves may defensively process 
feelings of guilt or shame to avoid the experience of those emotions.  Wolf et al. (2010) 
found guilt- or shame- proneness to be associated with reactions to private or public 
unethical behavior, respectively.  This suggests that compartmentalization may 
especially facilitate unethical behavior in private situations associated with guilt.  For a 
private, guilt-inducing transgression, people who compartmentalize must only avoid 
negative self-beliefs for that specific situation and with only the self as a witness.  
Shame, on the other hand, tends to result in more global negative self-evaluations 
(Cohen et al., 2011).  After a public transgression, people may process others’ feedback, 
making it relatively more difficult to avoid any negative self-implications.  The 
association we find between shame-proneness and greater honesty suggests a broader 
self-evaluation for unethical behavior. 
 In a related manner, creative people may compartmentalize to avoid the negative 
implications of unethical behavior.  Creative people feel unconstrained by rules 
(Wiltermuth & Gino, 2014) which may foster the cognitive flexibility to process 
unethical behavior in a different light.  Thus it seems plausible that creative people who 
compartmentalize might be most willing to construe unethical behavior in a self-serving 
way.  The combination of cognitive flexibility and defensive processing of negatives 
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may facilitate more exceptional, imaginative rationalizations for unethical behavior.  
For instance, creative compartmentalized people may rationalize cheating on a test as 
outperforming others in the class; or receiving unearned money as maximizing their 
profit (or, specific to the current experiment, reporting additional heads flipped as 
displaying psychokinesis).  Indeed, previous research suggests that creative people are 
better at justifying dishonest behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012).    
A second goal of the experiments was to examine how various priming 
conditions, creating different levels of temptation, affected the established 
compartmentalization effect.  First, we include instructions with the warning “don’t be a 
cheater” that presumably primes a “cheater” identity.  Bryan et al. (2013) find without 
qualification that people react with greater honesty after priming a “cheater” identity.  
They suggest that people wish to deny this negative identity and instead behave with 
honesty.  The current experiments extend the cheating paradigm developed by Bryan et 
al.  The present research suggests differential responses after activating a “cheater” 
identity.  We find that after a “cheater” identity prime, people who compartmentalize 
respond by cheating more and people who integrate respond with greater honesty 
(Experiment 1).  Thus, the warning “don’t be a cheater” does not always result in 
greater honesty.  Instead, people who compartmentalize may respond defensively when 
a negative self activates as a means to protect their self-worth.   
People who compartmentalize may rationalize their unethical behavior to avoid 
negative implications for the self.  Bandura’s (1999) review of research on moral 
agency finds that people can cognitively restructure unethical behavior as being 
relatively benign or morally justifiable.  Once restructured, people disengage their 
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moral self and limit any feelings of responsibility for the unethical behavior.  Similarly, 
Tsang (2002) discusses a specific moral rationalization process as a person’s capacity to 
construe unethical behavior in less negative, moral terms.  Thus, compartmentalization 
may facilitate a rationalization of unethical behavior, allowing people to avoid negative 
implications for the self.  The rationalization process used by people who 
compartmentalize may be motivated by self-enhancement goals (Ditzfeld & Showers, 
2014).  For instance, they may rationalize cheating on the coin flip task as an 
opportunity to earn more money.  The self might be enhanced by feeling good about 
receiving extra money while ignoring the unethical means of achievement.  The 
psychokinesis cover story could also justify unethical behavior.  In this case, people 
who compartmentalize deny reporting additional heads as cheating; they construe 
themselves as displaying superior psychokinesis.  Moreover, people who 
compartmentalize may infer from the online setting that the experimenters implicitly 
condone unethical behavior because of a lack of safeguards against it.  This 
rationalization would limit a person’s responsibility for cheating and shift blame instead 
on the experimenters.  In each of these examples, people who compartmentalize 
defensively process unethical behavior through rationalizations that pose less threat to 
the self and promote a positive self-view. 
In Experiment 2, we introduced a prime meant to vary temptation which also 
provides support for the association between compartmentalization and cheating.  
Specifically, self-deceptive enhancing (SDE) people who compartmentalize remain the 
most dishonest under conditions of greater temptation (money background; Experiment 
2).  This finding supports research suggesting that the concept of money can corrupt and 
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can increase unethical behavior (Gino & Mogilner, 2013).   Furthermore, the finding for 
SDE suggests only certain types of people process money in exploitative ways.  It 
seems plausible that high SDE people who compartmentalize process situational factors 
through a lens that seeks maximum personal benefit.  For these people, the money 
background may signal decisions based on business or economic outcomes, a mindset 
which increases unethical behavior (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013).   
The Self and Reduction of Unethical Behavior 
The confrontation of negative self-beliefs appears to be a central process that 
reduces unethical behavior.  The current experiments provide evidence that people who 
integrate behave more honestly.  Integratives, motivated by accurate self-perceptions, 
confront their negative self-beliefs (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014).  Meanwhile, people 
with compartmentalized selves behave unethically, but avoid viewing themselves in a 
negative light.  Indeed, most of the time compartmentalization is associated with high 
self-esteem and positive moods (Showers, 1992).  By defensively processing unethical 
behavior, people who compartmentalize may avoid a drop in self-esteem or mood.  
Instead, they avoid any negative implications and construe their unethical behavior in 
potentially self-enhancing ways.  Furthermore, previous research suggests that self-
enhancement may be inherently unethical (von Hippel et al., 2005).   
Interventions or primes that reduce self-enhancement motives may promote 
greater honesty and less defensive processing of threatening information.  Without a 
self-enhancement motive, people who compartmentalize may be more willing to 
confront and process accurately the consequences of unethical behavior.  Less 
defensiveness may also limit the rationalizations compartmentalized people use to 
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justify unethical behavior.  Instead of a self-enhancing interpretation for unethical 
behavior (e.g., “I got an A on the test”; “I’ll take home more money”), an accuracy 
motive may help with acknowledging the downside of unethical behavior (e.g., “I 
cheated on the test”; “I didn’t earn this money”).  At first, a reduction in defensiveness 
is likely limited to the current behavior in a specific context.  However, over time, if a 
person remains conscientious about confronting negative self-beliefs, the practice 
should generalize.  Eventually, this more generally integrative self should behave with 
greater honesty. 
Limitations and Issues 
 Unethical behavior at the individual level.  The current experiments assess 
cheating on the coin flip task as a comparison to chance (i.e., flipping 5 heads).  
However, given the online nature of the procedure, we cannot determine whether any 
individual participant actually flips a coin or behaves unethically.  A small percentage 
of participants likely flip 9 or 10 heads on the task and report their results truthfully.  
The fact that people on average report fewer heads flipped in the cheater condition 
compared to the control condition suggests a general tendency for people to cheat in the 
no instruction condition (Experiment 2).  The academic performance procedures used in 
previous research on compartmentalization and ethical behavior can determine cheating 
within each participant.  For instance, Thomas (2015) had participants solve a set of 
math problems on one sheet of paper.  The participants think they are recycling that 
sheet of paper and reporting separately the number of problems they solve.  
Unbeknownst to participants, the researchers recover the sheet recycled sheet to 
compare the number of correct responses participants report versus actually solve.  With 
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this procedure, researchers determine at the individual level whether a participant lies 
about their scores to receive unearned money.  Nevertheless, the consistent positive 
association between compartmentalization and cheating in the current experiments, 
which replicate previous findings (Showers et al., 2015; Thomas, 2015), suggest that the 
coin flip procedure validly assesses unethical behavior.   
 Self-deceptive enhancement.  The current experiments find competing results 
with regard to self-deceptive enhancement.  Given the recent focus on replication issues 
in social psychology, this result seems relevant for discussion (“Estimating the 
reproducibility of psychological science,” 2015).  Our results suggest that participants 
are sensitive to relatively small adjustments with the experimental context.  In 
Experiment 1, low SDE people who compartmentalize cheat the most.  This finding is 
likely driven by the “cheater” identity prime.  For these people who do not chronically 
self-enhance, a “cheater” identity prime may feel especially threatening.  Thus, they 
respond defensively to activate their positive compartments.  They may rationalize their 
unethical behavior by processing their behavior as making more money or proving 
psychokinesis.  People who tend chronically to enhance everywhere else (i.e., high 
SDE) may not have felt the need to self-enhance after a “cheater” identity prime.  
However, in Experiment 2 we find that high SDE people who compartmentalize cheat 
more than others under conditions of greater temptation (money prime).  Self-deceptive 
people may have greater sensitivity to situational temptations.  As a result, the money 
background puts these people in an economic mindset where maximum financial 
benefit motivates behavior.  The combination of an avoidance of negative implications 
for the self and chronic self-enhancement may motivate these people to scour carefully 
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their situation for any rationalizations (or temptations) to justify unethical behavior.  In 
this case, money may motivate them to receive extra money regardless of ethicality.  
These results highlight how participants’ responses are affected by only small variations 
to the situation.    
Future Directions 
A dynamic self-structure.  One avenue that future research might pursue is 
whether unethical behavior predicts changes to self-structure.  For instance, after 
unethical behavior people may respond defensively and compartmentalize.  A 
compartmentalized response could protect the self from negative implications of 
cheating if a person can rely only on the positive compartments.  The result that people 
who positively compartmentalize cheat more than people who positively integrate 
suggests such a defensive response (Experiment 2).  Conversely, honest behavior may 
affirm the self and promote the acknowledgment of negative self-beliefs, resulting in 
greater integration.  It would be interesting to explore whether a self-awareness prime 
results in the explicit creation of a “moral” or “honest” self-aspect for people who 
behave honestly and then integrate.  Many researchers suggest that people maintain 
some type of moral self, but those researchers do not assess the associated self-attributes 
(cf. Monin & Jordan, 2009).  The self-structure procedure could provide evidence for 
specific self-attributes people use to describe their moral self.  In the case of integration, 
the moral self-aspect may emerge in people who acknowledge potential negatives by 
behaving honestly.  Maybe these people feel taken advantage of or underappreciated for 
their honesty.  
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 Haidt’s social intuitionist and moral foundations theory.  Another intriguing 
direction in which researchers could extend the self-structure framework is Haidt’s 
(2001) social intuitionist model of morality.  Haidt suggests that people use automatic 
moral intuitions (e.g., feelings of good-bad) to guide moral judgments.  A rational, 
controlled moral reasoning process, akin to Kohlberg’s (1984a) notion of reasoning 
sophistication, occurs only after the initial moral intuition (and possibly not at all).  
Haidt and colleagues suggest 5 moral foundations upon which people across all cultures 
intuitively rely when making ethical or unethical choices.  Each of the foundations is an 
evolved psychological mechanism that represents culture-free moral regulation and 
virtue (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Spassena, et al., 2011).  Two of the foundations -- 
Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity -- focus on individual autonomy (individualizing 
foundations).  The other three foundations -- Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and 
Purity/Sanctity -- focus on the formation of larger groups or institutions (binding 
foundations).  Importantly, different people may rely on different foundations to guide 
ethical behavior.  For instance, people who self-report as politically more liberal more 
often use the individualizing foundations of Harm and Fairness.  On the other hand, 
people who self-report as politically more conservative tend to use all 5 foundations 
equally (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).   
It seems plausible that how a person manages negative self-beliefs may relate to 
the moral intuitions they tend to use.  People who compartmentalize may rely on certain 
foundations that facilitate avoiding processing unethical behavior negatively.  If this is 
the case, priming the less defensive foundations may promote greater honesty.  
Therefore, researchers should directly test the association between self-structure and 
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Haidt’s moral foundations.  People who compartmentalize may deny negative 
implications for behavior to remain pure and free of sin (Purity/Sanctity foundation; 
Graham et al., 2009).  On the other hand, people who integrate may rely on purity to a 
lesser degree as they remain open about flaws and negative self-beliefs.  Similarly, it 
seems reasonable to predict that concerns of fairness may require only taking what you 
earn, which would promote ethical behavior.  In this way, people who integrate and 
confront the implications of behaving unfairly may rely more heavily on this 
foundation.      
Conclusions 
 The purpose of the current experiments was to provide further evidence for a 
model of defensive self-structure (Thomas, Ditzfeld, & Showers, 2013) predicting 
unethical behavior.  Previous research established a positive association between 
compartmentalization and unethical behavior under neutral conditions (Showers et al., 
2014; Thomas, 2015).  Across two experiments, we find evidence supporting the 
previous relationship between compartmentalization and unethical behavior.  These 
results suggest that people who compartmentalize avoid or deny negative implications 
for unethical behavior.  In addition, the current experiments extend these findings using 
a different procedure to assess unethical behavior outside of a laboratory setting.  The 
online coin flip task in the current experiments eliminates any previous academic 
performance concerns and can be completed in a private, comfortable setting of the 
participant’s choice.  Thus, a model of defensive self-structure predicting unethical 




 The current experiments also determine various priming conditions under which 
people who integrate remain resilient against temptation.  After a “cheater” identity 
prime, people who integrate behave with more honesty and people who 
compartmentalize behave with more cheating. Even under conditions that heighten 
awareness of a dishonest framing for the behavior, people who compartmentalize 
minimize the negative implications for unethical behavior.  They may instead 
rationalize their behavior as normative or construe it in self-enhancing terms to maintain 
an overly positive self-view.  Moreover, integrative people remain relatively honest 
under multiple conditions.  Their confrontation of the negative consequences of 
potential unethical behavior seems to mitigate a more general tendency to self-enhance.  
Thus, the current experiments suggest that a reduction in defensive responding is one 
process to promote more honest, ethical behavior.  When people acknowledge and 
confront the potentially negative implications for their behavior, they remain resilient 
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Appendix A: Footnotes 
1
 There was an issue of whether the coin flip data could be treated as a continuous 
variable because the data was a series of discrete outcomes.  The present analyses 
assume that the 10 trials were large enough for the distribution of outcomes to 
approximate a normal distribution (Wadsworth, 1960).  Thus the coin flip outcomes 
were treated as a continuous variable for analysis. 
2 
Measures included in the Experiment 1 not discussed further, in order presented, 
are as follows for the laboratory session: Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965), Beck Depression Inventory – II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996b), Personal Need 
for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), Implicit Theories (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 
1995), Dichotomous Thinking Inventory (Oshio, 2009), Better than Average Trait 
Ratings (Alicke et al., 1995), Remote Associates Task (Gino & Ariely, 2012), Gough 
Personality Scale (Gough, 1979), Disgust Scale-Revised (Olatunji et al., 2007), and 
Creative Behavior Inventory (Hocevar, 1980).  Experiment 1 online session measures 
not discussed further, in order presented: Transaction Loss Frame (Kern & Chugh, 
2009), Goal Orientation at Work (VandeWalle, 1997), Threat Orientation Scale 
(Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008), Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Capara, & Pastorelli, 1996), age, sex, education level, relationship status, 
comfort with the English language, and feedback items about the study (Appendix A).  
3 
An alternative approach to the regression analysis used dummy coding to 
include all 3 instruction conditions in the same model.  The following dummy coding 
scheme was used: c1 (cheater = 1, cheating and no instruction = 0); c2 (cheating = 1, 
cheater and no instruction = 0).  The no instruction condition was the reference group.  
80 
 
The c1 and c2 terms were predictors in the basic model (instead of the paired instruction 
variable).  The model was the same otherwise with all main effects on Step 1 and all 
two-way interactions on Step 2.  Note that this coding does not directly test the 
instruction condition comparison significant in the main text results, namely cheater 
versus cheating.  The results of this model yield conceptually similar results as those 
reported.  There was a significant DI main effect, β = -.22, t(95) = -2.01, p = .05, sr
2
 = 
.04 and marginally significant phi main effect, β = .23, t(95) = 1.79, p = .08, sr
2
 = .03.  
The main effects were qualified by a significant Phi x Cheater Instruction (c1) 
interaction, β = .20, t(94) = 2.01, p = .05, sr
2
 = .04.  This interaction was significant 
within the excluded variable model, which entered only the Phi x Cheater Instruction 
term on Step 2 of the model.  These results suggested that, when phi was included, the 
cheater condition remained different when including terms for both the cheating and no 
instruction conditions in the model.  Furthermore, the phi main effect was present when 
including the entire sample, and given the prediction we had an a priori significant 
effect with a one-way analysis.   
4 
The same additional measures were included in Experiment 2’s laboratory 
session as in Experiment 1.  The same additional measures were included in Experiment 
2’s online session as in Experiment 1 except for additional feedback items about the 
study (Appendix B) and the removal of the Transaction Loss Frame (Kern & Chugh, 





























































































































































































































































































































Appendix C: Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Experiment 1: Predicted values and simple slopes analysis for reported heads, 
illustrating the interaction of compartmentalization (phi) and instruction at values 1 






















Figure 2.  Experiment 1 (Cheater vs. No Instruction): Predicted values and simple 
slopes analysis for reported heads, illustrating the interaction of compartmentalization 
(phi) and narcissism (NPI Total) total at values 1 standard deviation above and below 























   Panel A. Cheater versus No Instruction. 
 
   Panel B. Cheater versus Cheating. 
Figure 3.  Experiment 1: Predicted values analysis for reported heads, illustrating the 
interaction of compartmentalization (phi) and self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) total 































Figure 6.  Experiment 2: Distribution of total reported heads and self-structure predictor 
















Figure 7.  Experiment 2 (Money/Time vs. Gray, Trimmed Model): Predicted values and 
simple slopes analysis for reported heads, illustrating the interaction of 
compartmentalization (phi) and proportion of negative self-attributes (neg) at values 1 























Figure 8.  Experiment 2 (Money vs. Time, Untrimmed Model): Predicted values and 
simple slopes analysis for reported heads, illustrating the interaction of 
compartmentalization (phi), differential importance (DI), and proportion of negative 
self-attributes (neg) at values 1 standard deviation above and below the means.   
































Appendix D: Experiment 1 Feedback Items 
1a. Did you discuss this study with anyone else before coming to the session?  Yes or 
No 
1b. If yes, what additional information did you learn about the study’s procedure or 
purpose (open ended)? 
2. What did you think was the purpose of the coin flipping task (open ended)? 


































Appendix E: Experiment 2 Feedback Items 
1a. Did you discuss this study with anyone else before coming to the session?  Yes or 
No 
1b. If yes, what additional information did you learn about the study’s procedure or 
purpose (open ended)? 
2. For this research you have completed the following kinds of tasks: 
Session 1 (Dale Hall basement): self-descriptive card sorting task, in-lab 
questionnaires; 
Session 2 (Online): coin flip task, online questionnaires.   
Which 2 questionnaires or tasks were most important for the purpose of the 
study?  Please identify 2 specific questionnaires or tasks below and write what 
you believe to be the purpose of each (open ended). 
3. How much effort did you personally put into each of the following tasks?  Use the 
scale below each item to respond by selecting the appropriate number from 1 (not very 
much effort) to 7 (very much effort): 
 a. Describing yourself during the card sorting task 
 b. Trying to influence the coin flip 
 c. Answering the in-lab questionnaire items 
 d. Answering the online questionnaire items 




4. Using the scale below from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (extremely important), 
respond to each item by clicking a number.  While participating in this research, how 
important was it to you: 
 a. To put effort into the tasks 
 b. To provide honest and accurate answers 
 c. To learn about psychological research 
 d. To earn credit for your class 
 e. To learn about yourself through introspection 
 f. To earn money from the coin flips 



































Figure 1-F.  Experiment 2 (Money/Time vs. Gray, Untrimmed Model): Predicted 
values for reported heads, illustrating the interaction of compartmentalization (phi), 
differential importance (DI), and proportion of negative self-attributes (neg) at values 1 

















































Figure 1-G.  Experiment 2 (Money vs. Time, Trimmed Model): Predicted values for 
reported heads, illustrating the interaction of compartmentalization (phi), differential 
importance (DI), and proportion of negative self-attributes (neg) at values 1 standard 


































Figure 1-H.  Experiment 2 (Money vs. Time, Untrimmed Model): Predicted values for 
reported heads, illustrating the interaction of SDE and proportion of negative self-
attributes (neg) at values 1 standard deviation above and below the means.  n = 150. 
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